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ABSTRACT
The lodestar has been the dominant calculation method for
fee-shifting awards for nearly 40 years. But the lodestar has numerous persistent issues: it leads to extra litigation and judicial
effort, it results in highly variable fee awards, and it incentivizes
plaintiffs’ attorneys to bill extravagantly and reject settlement.
This Article argues that these issues with the lodestar, along with
many others, result from a mismatch between the lodestar and
the purpose of the underlying fee-shifting statutes, which is to
encourage attorneys to bring suits that would not normally be
economically viable. Encouraging attorneys to do so requires the
fee awards to be predictable. This Article concludes that predictability is impossible within the lodestar, which allows an attorney
to set the base calculation and asks a judge to use percentage cuts
to arrive at a just result. This Article therefore proposes adopting
a framework for fee awards that resembles the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, using an automatic calculation to set a fee range
that the judge can work within or, in an unusual case, from which
the judge can deviate upward or downward. This framework will
address each of the lodestar’s persistent concerns and provide the
predictability that will encourage the cases these fee-shifting statutes intend to encourage.
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INTRODUCTION
“I actually worked 185.38 so the above hours are exaggerated to
help us meet the lodestar but not seeming too far out of line.”1

The white owner of an auto repair shop specializing in German
cars might make for an unlikely civil rights plaintiff. But Mark Zastrow, the owner of Heights Autohaus in Houston’s Northside, was
thrust into an unusual situation with one of his parts suppliers, Mercedes-Benz of Houston Greenway, in 2013. Months prior, a customer had brought a Mercedes to Zastrow’s shop, and Zastrow
discovered numerous mechanical problems with the vehicle.2 The
Mercedes belonged to a Black couple, who were alleging in a civil
rights lawsuit that Mercedes Greenway had sold it to them in a defective condition.3 Zastrow agreed to sit for a deposition as an expert witness to discuss the problems with the car.4
The day before the deposition, a Mercedes Greenway employee called Zastrow, “advising him not to sit for the deposition
and warning him that he would regret it.”5 Zastrow did so anyway,
and the day after the deposition, the same employee called Zastrow
to tell him “that Mercedes Greenway would no longer sell parts to
him.”6 The next week, Mercedes Greenway’s lawyer sent Zastrow a
letter, which stated: “Pursuant to your expert testimony in the
above-referenced matter, this correspondence will serve as notice
that Mercedes-Benz of Houston Greenway is terminating their relationship with Heights Autohaus, effective immediately.”7
These facts set out a claim for retaliation under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, because Mercedes Greenway tried to retaliate against someone “who has attempted to vindicate another’s § 1981 rights.”8 And
certainly, allowing Mercedes Greenway to suffer no consequences
for its actions would render § 1981 ineffective. It was in Zastrow’s
interest to hold Mercedes Greenway accountable, but it was also
1. Declaration of David Yeremian in Support of Motion for Final Approval of
Class Action Settlement, Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, and Enhancement Award
at 51, Haro Lopez v. TW Servs., Inc., No. 30-2019-01044791 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr.
14, 2021).
2. Zastrow v. Hous. Auto Imps. Greenway Ltd., 789 F.3d 553, 558 (5th Cir.
2015).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 558 n.1.
8. Id. at 563.
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strongly in the public interest to allow plaintiffs like Zastrow to vindicate their rights.
But the market for legal services would not be able to assist
Zastrow here. While Zastrow’s claim was strong, his expected recovery was low. And indeed, even though a civil jury returned a
verdict in his favor,9 they awarded a grand total of only $939.29 in
damages.10
Claims like this are called negative-value claims, because they
cost more to bring than the ultimate recovery is worth, if one is
even successful at all.11 In Zastrow’s case, the trial alone, which
lasted 3 days,12 would easily cost more than $939 in legal fees per
day. And of course, it would be absurd to expect Zastrow to prosecute a trial pro se, let alone a trial governed by a complex legal
framework such as the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burdenshifting approach.13 So how could he find, let alone pay, a lawyer to
litigate this case?
Luckily for Zastrow, § 1981 claims, like many others,14 are governed by a fee-shifting statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, allowing him to
move for an award of attorneys’ fees.15 Zastrow’s attorney took this
negative-value case likely knowing that he could be compensated
through this fee shifting.16 And in Zastrow’s case, as in most jurisdictions today, these fees are calculated using a method called the
lodestar. The lodestar, in theory, is simple math: multiply the number of hours an attorney reasonably expended on a case by the attorney’s reasonable hourly rate to arrive at a fee.17 This formulation
makes logical sense, as compensating an attorney based on the
work they reasonably did feels almost obvious.
While the lodestar has become the standard baseline for most
fee calculations since the Third Circuit proposed it nearly 50 years
9. Zastrow v. Hous. Auto M. Imps. Greenway Ltd., 695 F. App’x 774, 777 (5th
Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
10. Id.
11. Nicholas Almendares, The False Allure of Settlement Pressure, 50 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 271, 314–15 (2018).
12. Jury Trial Minute Entries, Zastrow v. Hous. Auto M. Imps. Greenway
Ltd., No. 4:13-cv-574, 2014 WL 1794897 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7–9, 2016), ECF Nos. 178,
190, 200.
13. Zastrow, 789 F.3d at 564 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973)).
14. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
FOURTH, § 14.11 (2004).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).
16. See Martha Pacold, Comment, Attorney’s Fees in Class Actions Governed
by Fee-Shifting Statutes, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (2001).
17. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167–68 (3d Cir. 1973).
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ago,18 it can produce inconsistent results, it is easily manipulated,
and it leads to prolonged litigation, chewing up as much as 10 percent of the entire judicial workload.19 In Zastrow, the parties’ initial
filings on attorneys’ fees demonstrated the wide variance in interpreting a seemingly clear and elegant formula. Zastrow’s counsel
calculated its fee request at $197,160.20 Meanwhile, Mercedes
Greenway asked for a fee award of $0.21 The court, finding that the
requests made by Zastrow’s counsel were largely reasonable,
awarded $110,000.22
Mercedes Greenway appealed this $110,000 award, and the
Fifth Circuit reversed because the trial court had failed to state that
it had accounted for Zastrow’s degree of success in fashioning the
fee award, as his non-§ 1981 claims had been dismissed.23 On remand, briefing commenced anew on the question of fees.24 Zastrow’s counsel argued for $117,000, to account for the time
expended on the previous appeal, and Mercedes Greenway argued
for an award of no more than $5,640.25 The district court, in a brief
order, sided with Zastrow’s attorney and awarded $117,000.26
Up again the case went on appeal. The Fifth Circuit, perhaps as
exhausted as anyone by this procedural history, opened its opinion
with the following line: “This is the third appeal in this case and the
second appeal on the attorneys’ fees award.”27 The Fifth Circuit,
despite the district court’s minimal explanation, affirmed the fee
award.28 Mercedes Greenway sought certiorari, and the Supreme
Court denied the petition on February 19, 2019, 6 years after the
18. Id.
19. Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70 TEX. L. REV. 865, 906–07, 907 n.156 (1992).
20. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Zastrow v. Hous. Auto M. Imps.
Greenway Ltd., No. 4:13-cv-574, 2014 WL 1794897 at *3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2016),
ECF No. 205.
21. Defendant Mercedes-Benz of Houston Greenway’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney Fees at 7–17, Zastrow, 2014 WL 1794897, ECF No. 211.
22. Zastrow v. Hous. Auto M. Imps. Greenway Ltd., 695 F. App’x 774, 777
(5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
23. Id. at 779.
24. Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Attorney Fees, Zastrow, 2014 WL
1794897, ECF No. 244.
25. Defendant Mercedes-Benz of Houston Greenway’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Attorney Fees at 16–17, Zastrow, 2014 WL 1794897,
ECF No. 250.
26. Zastrow v. Hous. Auto M. Imps. Greenway, Ltd., 736 F. App’x 496, 497
(5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1217 (2019).
27. Id. at 496.
28. Id. at 497.
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inception of the lawsuit and almost 3 years after fees were first
awarded.29
Even as various courts adopted the lodestar method, they simultaneously warned of its dangers. The Supreme Court, perhaps
envisioning a case bouncing up and down on appeal like Zastrow,
cautioned when adopting the lodestar that “[a] request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.”30 But additional litigation, inconsistency, and manipulability are just a
subset of the issues associated with the lodestar method. The Third
Circuit, barely a decade after adopting the lodestar, commissioned
a task force report to address its failings.31 The Task Force determined that in addition to the problems illustrated in Zastrow, the
lodestar also led to increased workloads for district judges; perverse
incentives for attorneys, especially regarding settlement; a false
sense of mathematical precision; and a bias against public interest
lawyers.32
Indeed, many of these concerns are in tension with one another, and addressing one often results in sacrificing another. For
example, it is often unrealistic to review every individual time entry
in complex cases, leading district courts to use percentage cuts to
adjust the overall award rather than excising problematic entries.33
In short, they are ceding fairness and consistency in the name of
judicial economy.34
29. Hous. Auto M. Imps. Greenway, Ltd. v. Zastrow, 139 S. Ct. 1217 (2019);
Order Awarding Attorneys’ Fees, Zastrow, 2014 WL 1794897, ECF No. 218; Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Zastrow, 2014 WL 1794897,
ECF No. 1.
30. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
31. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES (1985),
reprinted in 108 F.R.D. 237, 245–49 (1985); see also Justin Lamb, Comment, The
Lodestar Process of Determining Attorney’s Fees: Guiding Light or Black Hole?, 27
J. LEGAL PRO. 203 (2003) (providing a summary of the Third Circuit Task Force’s
potential drawbacks to the lodestar method).
32. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 245–49. A full accounting
of the Third Circuit Task Force’s findings can be found below in Part II.A.
33. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en
banc) (“It is neither practical nor desirable to expect the trial court judge to have
reviewed each paper in this massive case file to decide, for example, whether a
particular motion could have been done in 9.6 hours instead of 14.3 hours.”); see
also Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1986) (“There
is no requirement, either in this court or elsewhere, that district courts identify and
justify each disallowed hour.”).
34. And when fees motions are litigated, those attorney hours are recoverable
in several circuits and thus subject to the same considerations above. E.g., Env’t
Def. Fund, Inc. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 672 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Knighton v.
Watkins, 616 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1980).
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True improvement in the fee-shifting framework should be
based on an understanding of why fee shifting is necessary. Feeshifting statutes exist because Congress has decided that people like
Mark Zastrow should be encouraged to enforce certain rights. In a
scenario where Zastrow’s attorney could be awarded $0 or $5,640
for a case successfully litigated through trial, he might be entirely
deterred from taking Zastrow’s case, even though the case was meritorious. The goal of a fee-calculation method should be to produce
awards high enough to encourage litigation of meritorious claims,
but not so high as to result in frivolous litigation that might chill
economic activity. And if the goal is encouraging meritorious suits,
attorneys will be more likely to take such cases if the fee award is
predictable, even if predictable awards sacrifice the fiction of the
billable hour. As explained below, district courts currently have
three distinct opportunities in the lodestar calculation process to
adjust the fee calculation, and the vast majority of those adjustments are downward adjustments.35
This Article argues that if the goal of fee shifting is to encourage meritorious suits, the solution to the lodestar puzzle has to
include more fundamental change than the Third Circuit Task Force
or other scholars have proposed so far. Creating predictable fee
awards requires standardizing the baseline from which judges work.
In the current framework, the starting point is always the time
records of the moving party. But law practices are heterogeneous,
from solo practices to large multinational firms. Even among firms
of the same size, two firms might employ vastly different staffing
practices on the same case. Two attorneys submitted time records in
Zastrow’s case.36 What if the firm had decided four attorneys were
needed instead, leading to twice as many attorneys present for each
case meeting? Are those additional attorney hours reasonably
expended?
The answer already exists in federal practice but from an unexpected source. Consider the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the
Guidelines): Implemented in the 1980s in order to curtail broad,
nearly unchecked judicial discretion in federal sentencing, the
Guidelines remove virtually all discretion from the initial calculation, which yields a precise sentencing range.37 Although judges can
35. See infra Part III.B (discussing the three distinct places where district
courts can adjust the lodestar calculation); see also infra Part I.C (discussing the
Supreme Court’s rejection or narrowing of virtually every upward adjustment).
36. Order Awarding Attorneys’ Fees, Zastrow v. Hous. Auto M. Imps. Greenway Ltd., No. 413-cv-574, 2014 WL 1794897 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2016), ECF No. 218.
37. Daniel M. Isaacs, Note, Baseline Framing in Sentencing, 121 YALE L.J.
426, 432–33 (2011).
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choose to stay within this sentencing range and typically benefit
from a presumption of reasonableness if they do, they retain discretion at the end of that process to vary downward or upward from
that range for numerous reasons.38
Given the tens of thousands of lodestar calculations in the federal courts in the last few decades, a Fees Commission can individually examine each fee-shifting statute to determine what types of
firms typically take cases implicating specific fee-shifting statutes,
which elements of a case create work in that statute’s context, and
thus what monetary value should be assigned to each phase of a
case. The Commission would then create a calculation, similar to
the calculation of a defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range, that
would result in a fee award range. If a district court awarded fees in
that range, the award would be presumptively reasonable, but the
district court would retain the ability to award an amount outside
that range if it provided specific reasons for doing so.
While judges should retain discretion to adjust the fee award
according to the precise circumstances of the case, as judges do in
the criminal sentencing context, a Guidelines-style framework
would provide a much more consistent floor for fee awards nationwide. Unlike criminal sentencing, where the Sentencing Guidelines
calculation has been criticized for its overly rigid approach to individualized determinations of defendants’ personal liberty, the predictability provided by the rigidity of a Guidelines-style fee
calculation would align with the goals of the underlying statutes
better than an exhaustive search for the precise amount of compensation. Indeed, this Article argues that a Sentencing Guidelinesstyle calculation of fees is both feasible and desirable for all parties
involved: the plaintiff,39 the plaintiff’s attorney, the judge, and the
defendant.
This framework has the power to drastically curtail lengthy
fees litigation, preserve some discretion for judges to adjust the fee
award based on the particular details of the case, and remove uncertainty for prospective litigants and their lawyers regarding fee
calculations at both the high and the low ends of the current spec38. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (laying out seven factors that should be considered in conjunction with the Guideline range when imposing a sentence); United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that the Sentencing Guidelines cannot be mandatory under the Sixth Amendment).
39. This Article uses the terms “plaintiff” and “defendant” here to represent
the party moving for fees and the party liable for fees, respectively, as the vast
majority of statutory fee-shifting schemes overwhelmingly compensate prevailing
plaintiffs for their legal bills. The use of these terms is not meant to imply that feeshifting does not occur in the other direction.
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trum of fee awards. The framework should also better serve the
purpose of the fee-shifting statutes underlying these awards: encouraging private parties to enforce their legal rights, especially for
negative-value claims.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, it discusses the
passage of fee-shifting statutes to fill a gap in enforcing negativevalue claims and the lodestar’s adoption as the prevailing method to
calculate fee awards. Then, in Part II, it discusses the practical
drawbacks of the lodestar method and proposals that have been put
forward to solve some of the method’s difficulties. Part III explains
that the lodestar calculation itself, as a series of discretionary
choices, is fundamentally in tension with a goal of predictability,
and thus cannot satisfy Congress’s intent in enacting fee-shifting
statutes. Finally, in Part IV, this Article discusses the broad strokes
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and why the same framework
is a particularly good fit to replace the lodestar calculation.
I. THE RISE

OF THE

LODESTAR

IN

FEE-SHIFTING CASES

A. The Origins and Legislative Intent of Fee Shifting
Traditionally, U.S. litigants have borne their own costs in litigation, a principle known as the American Rule.40 The American
Rule was actually created in order to encourage poor litigants to
bring claims without the fear of a fee-shifting penalty, but with the
rise of statutes with private rights of action and of civil rights lawsuits, the American Rule served just as much to deter worthy plaintiffs from filing claims.41 As a result, statutes started to include feeshifting provisions to incentivize attorneys to take these cases.42
The existence of a fee-shifting statute is typically evidence that
Congress thinks that suits involving a particular class of plaintiffs
are in the public interest and would not be brought without a provi40. Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO, L.L.C., 576 U.S. 121, 126 (2015).
41. Risa A. Lieberwitz, Attorneys’ Fees, the NLRB, and the Equal Access to
Justice Act: From Bad to Worse, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 4, 6–7 (1984).
42. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (establishing fee provisions enacted as part of
Civil Rights Act of 1964). Many early statutes did not have fee-shifting provisions
originally included, and the courts were often ordering attorneys’ fees of their own
volition, but the Supreme Court limited the use of courts’ equitable powers to
award attorneys’ fees in 1975, necessitating the creation of further fee-shifting statutes. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247–57
(1975) (discussing the history of the American Rule and its exceptions, leading up
to a holding that courts cannot use their equitable power to award attorneys’ fees
in private attorney general contexts).
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sion for attorneys’ fees.43 The implication is that the claims covered
by the fee-shifting statute are negative-value claims, where the cost
of litigation exceeds the potential benefit.44 Fee-shifting statutes exist to encourage enforcement of the rights underlying negativevalue claims. Two of the most common fee-shifting statutes, 42
U.S.C. § 198845 and the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),46 both
include a discussion of this purpose in their legislative history.
The stated purpose of § 1988, in the Senate report, was “to
remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws . . . and to achieve
consistency in our civil rights laws.”47 Like the civil rights statutes
passed in the 1960s, older statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 depended “heavily on private enforcement, and fee awards have
proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies
which these laws contain.”48 The report recognized that “the citizen
who must sue to enforce the law [in many cases] has little or no
money with which to hire a lawyer,” and that an ability to recover
attorneys’ fees was vital “if those who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity.”49 Indeed, this was
the exact dilemma Zastrow faced in vindicating his claim against
Mercedes Greenway.
The Senate recognized that many fee-shifting statutes already
existed by 1976, when the report on § 1988 was published, and that
“fees are an integral part of the remedy necessary to achieve com43. Not all fee-shifting serves this purpose. Fee-shifting under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37, for example, is meant to compensate a party for the work they
do addressing the misconduct of the other party in discovery. To make a party
whole, the court must necessarily look to the actual work done. This Article does
not pertain to the calculations for mechanisms, such as Rule 37, that are merely
meant to make the other party whole.
44. Negative-value claims are often determined strictly on the idea that the
monetary cost of bringing an action outweighs the potential monetary award, but
litigants may make the decision not to bring a claim because the totality of “transaction costs of bringing an individual action exceed the potential relief.” In re Baby
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 2013).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows for an award of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or
related civil rights statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Virtually every Supreme Court
case mentioned in this Part involved fee shifting under 42 U.S.C § 1988 or a statute
whose fee calculation was judicially deemed identical to that of 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
46. 5 U.S.C. § 504. EAJA allows for an award of fees for plaintiffs with a net
worth of under $2,000,000 in a suit against the United States government. 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d).
47. S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 1 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,
5909.
48. Id. at 5910.
49. Id.
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pliance with our statutory policies.”50 The report incorporated
strong Supreme Court language, stating that “[n]ot to award counsel fees in cases such as this would be tantamount to repealing the
Act itself by frustrating its basic purpose. . . . Without counsel fees
the grant of Federal jurisdiction is but a gesture.”51 Indeed, given
the recognition of the efficacy of fee shifting, “[s]ince 1964, every
major civil rights law passed by the Congress has included, or has
been amended to include, one or more fee provisions.”52 The Senate report concluded: “If our civil rights laws are not to become
mere hollow pronouncements which the average citizen cannot enforce, we must maintain the traditional effective remedy of fee
shifting in these cases.”53
The legislative history of EAJA is similar. The explicit purpose
of the bill, in the 1980 House report, was to “reduce the deterrents
and disparity by entitling certain prevailing parties to recover an
award of attorney fees, expert witness fees and other expenses
against the United States.”54 The report recognized that the American Rule was actually deterring litigation in potential suits against
the government, an effect inconsistent with the purpose of the
American Rule.55 The report specifically invoked the case where
“the cost of contesting a government order . . . exceeds the amount
at stake,” noting that a potential plaintiff would find it “more practical to endure injustice than to contest it.”56 EAJA was therefore a
recognition “that the expense of correcting error on the part of the
government should not rest wholly on the party whose willingness
to litigate or adjudicate has helped to define the limits of federal
authority.”57
With fee-shifting statutes becoming commonplace in the 1960s
and 1970s, courts were left to determine how to calculate attorneys’
fees under these statutes.58 During this time, courts tested a few
competing methods.
The Fifth Circuit formulated a list of twelve factors to consider
when determining a fee award in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13 (1973)).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 5913.
54. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 6 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4984, 4984.
55. Id. at 4988.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 4989.
58. Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards of Attorney’s Fees Against the Federal Government, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 745 (1993).
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press, Inc.59 Although the factors were relevant to the question of
what fee award might be reasonable, the factors overlapped substantially and provided “very little actual guidance” to courts regarding the process for calculating attorneys’ fees.60 The Ninth
Circuit quickly adopted the Johnson framework,61 but the lack of a
clear formula and the overlap between the factors led to implementation troubles. Even so, the echoes of Johnson persisted for over a
decade: 42 U.S.C. § 1988 itself discussed Johnson approvingly in its
legislative history, leading courts to look to the Johnson factors as a
key part of the legislative history of § 1988.62 It was not until 1989
when the Supreme Court, in moving away from legislative history
as an interpretive tool, disowned Johnson as a standalone method
for setting attorneys’ fees.63
But even as some courts were applying the Johnson factors in
the context of § 1988, many were adopting a fee calculation method
that appeared much more administrable: the lodestar. The following Subpart explores the development of the lodestar in the federal
courts and the development of courts’ obsession with precision at
the expense of the legislative intent of the fee-shifting statutes.
B. Lindy: The Lodestar’s Initial Formulation
The Third Circuit was the first to articulate the lodestar
method as the preferred method for calculating attorneys’ fees in its
1973 decision in Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.64 Within a decade,
59. Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974).
These twelve factors are as follows: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee for similar work in the community; (6)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or
the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case;
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between the attorney
and the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Id.
60. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,
563 (1986).
61. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69–70 (9th Cir. 1975).
62. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1983) (analyzing Johnson
and three district court cases cited approvingly in the legislative history to interpret
§ 1988).
63. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989) (“The Johnson factors
may be relevant in adjusting the lodestar amount, but no one factor is a substitute
for multiplying reasonable billing rates by a reasonable estimation of the number
of hours expended on the litigation.”).
64. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Corp., 487 F.2d
161 (3d Cir. 1973).
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the lodestar method had been blessed by the Supreme Court65 as
well as the Fifth Circuit,66 which had originally forged its own path
with Johnson in 1974.
The district court in Lindy had very little guidance when it
awarded attorneys’ fees. As a result, the district court merely created and weighed four factors it considered relevant to the fee
award: (1) the percentage of a claimant’s recovery awarded as attorneys’ fees in other cases in the district, (2) the amount of the
recovery in this case, (3) the amount the attorneys had received
from their clients under preexisting private agreements, and (4) the
time spent in connection with the litigation.67
In vacating the fee award, the Third Circuit commented that
this listing, without any additional insight into process, “makes
meaningful review difficult and gives little guidance to attorneys
and claimants.”68 The animating principle the Third Circuit articulated for the basis of a fee award was compensation for “the reasonable value of services.”69 The court then detailed the three-step
process that would be required of district courts to ensure that they
properly captured that value.
The first step is to inquire “into the hours spent by the attorneys—how many hours were spent in what manner by which attorneys.”70 The court cautioned that although absolute precision was
not necessary, there needed to be “some fairly definite information
as to the hours devoted to various general activities,” divided by
activity and the type of person undertaking them.71
The second step requires an “attempt to value those services,”
a question that typically starts with the attorney’s normal billing
rate.72 The court noted that different attorneys might have different
reasonable rates, and that even the same attorney might have dif65. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (1983) (“The most useful starting point for
determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”).
66. See Graves v. Barnes, 700 F.2d 220, 222 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The Fifth Circuit
recently adopted the ‘lodestar’ method of calculating attorney’s fees relied upon by
the Second, Third, and District of Columbia Circuits.”).
67. Lindy, 487 F.2d at 166. This list of factors seems to have very little in
common with standard fee award analyses, but Lindy was a complex antitrust case
that involved multiple classes of plaintiffs, some of whom were unrepresented. Id.
at 164. Lindy therefore includes a substantial discussion about the proper way to
situate the taxing of fees from an award to unrepresented plaintiffs, one which is
beyond the scope of this article and thus omitted here. Id.
68. Id. at 166–67.
69. Id. at 167.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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ferent reasonable rates depending on the activity.73 The court concluded that the first two steps together would provide “the only
reasonably objective basis for valuing an attorney’s services.”74 The
court therefore concluded that the amount derived from the hours
spent and the reasonable rate “should be the lodestar of the court’s
fee determination.”75
The court cautioned that the inquiry could not end there,
though, as a “court cannot properly fix attorneys’ fees” with only
this calculation.76 Instead, the court added a third step. “[A]t least
two other factors” had to be addressed after the calculation, if applicable: (1) the contingent nature of success and (2) the quality of
an attorney’s work, based on “the complexity and novelty of the
issues presented, the quality of the work that the judge has been
able to observe, and the amount of the recovery obtained.”77 The
Third Circuit noted that the second factor was “designed to take
account of an unusual degree of skill, be it unusually poor or unusually good,” and that the lodestar was the fairest calculation of value
of the work of most attorneys.78
The Third Circuit continued to clarify this three-step process
over the next few years, but it repeatedly endorsed the steps that it
outlined in Lindy, all while noting that “[i]t was not and is not our
intention that the inquiry into the adequacy of the fee assume massive proportions.”79
C. The Supreme Court and the Increasing Primacy of the
Lodestar Calculation
In 1983, the Supreme Court first weighed in on the lodestar
method in Hensley v. Eckerhart, stating that the lodestar calculation
was “[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of
a reasonable fee.”80 And in the intervening 40 years, the Supreme
Court has relied largely on the lodestar calculation itself, functionally narrowing the enhancements under the contingency and per73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 168.
76. Id. at 167.
77. Lindy, 487 F.2d at 168.
78. Id. at 168–69.
79. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
540 F.2d 102, 116 (3d Cir. 1976).
80. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Hensley, though, did not
mention the lodestar by name or cite Lindy’s approach to fees. Id.
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formance factors out of existence.81 This gradual shift has placed a
de facto ceiling on fees awarded under the lodestar calculation, a
ceiling that is set unilaterally by the plaintiff’s attorney rather than
by the judge.
1. The Disappearance of the Upward Performance Adjustment
The Hensley Court endorsed the possibility that “results obtained”82 might warrant an upward or downward fee adjustment,
usually through a multiplier, and that “in some cases of exceptional
success an enhanced award may be justified.”83 But because the
question presented involved a party who obtained only partial relief, the Court did not address the question of a performance adjustment directly.
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has largely foreclosed
the possibility of enhancing the lodestar calculation through upward
adjustments for performance, although opinions continue to insist
that these positive multipliers are possible.84 Just one term after
Hensley, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Blum v. Stenson.85
The district court in Blum awarded a 50 percent increase over the
lodestar calculation “for the complexity of the case, the novelty of
the issues, and the ‘great benefit’ achieved,” and the court of appeals affirmed.86 The Supreme Court reversed.
Recognizing that Hensley specifically contemplated upward fee
adjustments, the Blum Court held that upward fee adjustments
were not prohibited.87 But the Court placed the burden on the fee
applicant to show that an upward adjustment was appropriate, and
it determined that the plaintiff had not carried this burden in the
instant case.88 The Court surmised that the complexity and novelty
of the case “presumably were fully reflected in the number of billable hours recorded by counsel.”89 The Court rejected even a scena81. It is important to note that despite the Supreme Court’s pronouncements,
they do not apply to state fee-shifting statutes, and many state courts have the
freedom to adjust the lodestar calculation upward or downward. See Matthew D.
Klaiber, Comment, A Uniform Fee-Setting System for Calculating Court-Awarded
Attorneys’ Fees: Combining Ex Ante Rates with a Multifactor Lodestar Method and
a Performance-Based Mathematical Model, 66 MD. L. REV. 228, 244–46 (2006)
(discussing the range of discretionary tools available to state courts).
82. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
83. Id. at 435.
84. Sisk, supra note 58, at 756–58.
85. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
86. Id. at 891.
87. Id. at 897.
88. Id. at 898.
89. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\127-1\DIK103.txt

2022]

unknown

NAVIGATING BEYOND

THE

Seq: 17

LODESTAR

25-OCT-22

11:20

117

rio where “the experience and special skill of the attorney will
require the expenditure of fewer hours than counsel normally
would be expected to spend on a particularly novel or complex issue,” determining that the hourly rate would capture the appropriate value of the attorney in this scenario.90
The Court also assumed that the quality of the representation
would normally be captured in the reasonable hourly rate.91 Therefore, any upward adjustment for quality of representation would
require a showing that the results were truly exceptional compared
to the time expended and the hourly rate charged, or the adjustment would constitute “a clear example of double counting.”92
Finally, the Court rejected the district court’s rationale that the
novel legal issues made the representation risky.93 Because there
was no record evidence identified regarding the risk, the Court
avoided the question about whether the risk of losing might justify
a fee enhancement.94
Recall that the Third Circuit’s performance factor in Lindy was
defined as “the complexity and novelty of the issues presented, the
quality of the work that the judge has been able to observe, and the
amount of the recovery obtained.”95 The district court in Blum relied on these exact rationales, and yet the Supreme Court rejected
the enhancements anyway.
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air.96 The Court was
unequivocal: “[P]erformance ordinarily should not be used to adjust the lodestar” due to the danger of “double counting.”97 But the
Court rejected an upward adjustment in a scenario it had explicitly
identified in Blum as the rare case that would justify one. In Blum,
the Court stated that the results of a case could be exceptional rela90. Id.
91. Id. at 899.
92. Id. at 899–900.
93. Id. at 901.
94. Id. at 901 n.17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote in a concurrence that the particular statute’s legislative history included a reference to the Johnson factors, one of
which was regarding whether the fee was fixed or contingent. Id. at 902–03. The
legislative history also cited a subsequent district court case that granted an upward adjustment for exactly this reason. Id. at 903; see also Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680, 685–86 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev’d on other grounds, 436 U.S.
547 (1978).
95. Lindy, 487 F.2d at 168.
96. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546
(1986).
97. Id. at 566.
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tive to the reasonable number of hours expended (due to efficiency) and the reasonable rate (due to the qualifications of the
attorney).98 The Delaware Valley Court instead rejected a multiplier because the district court had eliminated some of the claimed
hours and because the attorney for the relevant phase of litigation
was an “‘inexperienced attorne[y]’ without ‘any prior significant litigation experience.’”99 An inexperienced attorney working for a
limited number of hours and still returning quality results was the
kind of exceptional case that the Blum Court carved out, and yet
the Supreme Court, just two years later, identified it as self-defeating evidence.
The most recent Supreme Court guidance on the matter is Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn,100 a foster care class action that led to
a consent decree. The district court awarded a 75 percent enhancement due to counsel’s outlay of $1.7 million in costs and the fact
that counsel had shown “a higher degree of skill, commitment, dedication, and professionalism . . . than the Court has seen displayed
by the attorneys in any other case during its 27 years on the
bench.”101 The district court continued: “[A]fter 58 years as a practicing attorney and a federal judge, the Court is unaware of any
other case in which a plaintiff class has achieved such a favorable
result on such a comprehensive scale.”102 Each member of the Eleventh Circuit panel wrote separately but ultimately voted to uphold
the fee enhancement.103
The Supreme Court reversed, noting that “we have never sustained an enhancement of a lodestar amount for performance.”104
The Court laid out three scenarios in which an enhancement might
be appropriate. First, when specific proof existed that the calculated
hourly rate “does not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value.”105 This situation, however, would not be considered an
enhancement under Blum, as the Blum Court included this question in the determination of the hourly rate. Second, an enhancement might be appropriate if the attorney had substantial expenses
98. Blum, 465 U.S. at 899.
99. Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 567 (alteration in original) (quoting Del. Valley
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272, 279 n.10 (3d Cir.
1985)).
100. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010).
101. Id. at 548.
102. Id. at 548–49.
103. Id. at 549–50.
104. Id. at 552.
105. Id. at 554–55.
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during drawn-out litigation.106 And third, an enhancement might be
appropriate if the fees were exceptionally delayed.107 But in these
latter two scenarios, the Supreme Court concluded that a district
court would have to use a specific calculation, such as a standard
interest rate for qualifying costs, to allow for appellate review.108
Given this narrow interpretation of enhancements, the Supreme Court determined that the district court’s enhancement was
“impressionistic” and “did not employ a methodology that permitted meaningful appellate review.”109 Even though the district court
properly cited counsel’s $1.7 million in costs as a factor, the fact that
the district court did not calculate interest or use another quantitative method to account for those costs was fatal.110 The Supreme
Court therefore reversed the award and remanded for further
proceedings.111
2. City of Burlington and the Rejection of the Contingency
Adjustment
Delaware Valley returned to the Supreme Court one term after
its original consideration, this time to determine whether the contingency factor was applicable to the fee award—that is, whether a
multiplier would be appropriate to account for the plaintiff’s risk of
losing the case.112 The Court deadlocked on this question, with four
Justices prepared to strike down the contingency factor broadly as
impermissible double counting113 and four endorsing the use of the
contingency factor as an enhancement in the instant case.114 The
controlling opinion, by Justice O’Connor, insisted that the contingency enhancement should remain available to other plaintiffs but
that in the instant case, the lodestar properly reflected the level of
risk.115 Her proposed test would require a plaintiff to establish
“that without an adjustment for risk [they] ‘would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel in the local or other relevant
market.’”116
106. Id. at 555.
107. Id. at 555–56.
108. Id. at 556–58.
109. Id. at 558.
110. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 557–58.
111. Id. at 560.
112. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711
(1987).
113. Id. at 731 (plurality opinion).
114. Id. at 735 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 731–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
116. Id. at 733 (quoting id. at 731).
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Despite leaving the question of contingency enhancements
open in Delaware Valley II, the Supreme Court revisited the matter
five years later in City of Burlington v. Dague, after two Justices
favorable to the enhancement had been replaced with two Justices
who disfavored it.117 The City of Burlington Court rejected Justice
O’Connor’s test as unmanageable and unpredictable.118 The Court
determined that the proper and most efficient solution was to fully
foreclose the possibility of an enhancement based on the riskiness
of a case.119 The Court rooted its preference for efficiency in a line
from Hensley, noting that the setting of attorneys’ fees “should not
result in a second major litigation.”120 The Court reasoned that allowing the contingency enhancement would “make the setting of
fees more complex and arbitrary, hence more unpredictable, and
hence more litigable.”121 In essence, the Court’s assumption that
lower courts should not be tied up with fees litigation led the Court
to discard the contingency adjustment, a major financial incentive
for plaintiffs’ attorneys to take fee-shifting cases.
Although the rejection of the contingency enhancement does
not apply to all fee-shifting statutes,122 the Supreme Court has incorporated the enhancement’s prohibition by reference into the
analysis of many of the most common fee-shifting statutes.123 As a
result, the lodestar calculation does not account for the low likelihood of winning a case through a direct multiplier; instead, the risk
of losing a case can only be accounted for through the hourly rate
or the number of reasonable hours expended, where it will likely
have a smaller effect.

117. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992). Justices Brennan and
Marshall were replaced, respectively, by Justices Souter and Thomas, who both
voted in the City of Burlington majority. Id.
118. Id. at 563–64. Justice O’Connor, unsurprisingly, dissented. Id. at 575
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 566–67 (majority opinion).
120. Id. at 566 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437).
121. Id.
122. For example, in the Social Security context, a contingency factor of two is
still routinely applied. E.g., Damron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 104 F.3d 853 (6th Cir.
1997). It is important to note, though, that in the Social Security context, fees are
taken out of the claimant’s award and explicitly capped at 25 percent of the recovery. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).
123. See City of Burlington, 505 U.S. at 562 (noting that the relevant language
in the fee-shifting statute “is similar to that of many other federal fee shifting statutes; our case law construing what is a ‘reasonable’ fee applies uniformly to all of
them”).
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3. Partial Relief and Downward Adjustments
Despite prohibiting virtually all upward adjustments, the Supreme Court, very early on, endorsed downward adjustments for
cases in which plaintiffs did not obtain all of the relief requested in
the complaint, which was the primary dispute in Hensley.124 As a
general matter, plaintiffs are prevailing parties for fees purposes “if
they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves
some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.”125 The
Court recognized that if “a plaintiff has obtained excellent results
. . . the fee award should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff
failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit.”126 But
the lodestar calculation “may be an excessive amount” in the case
where a plaintiff “has achieved only partial or limited success.”127
The Hensley Court refused to articulate a formula but merely
cautioned that a district court should “make clear that it has considered the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and
the results obtained.”128 The Court suggested that district courts
may “attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated”
or “simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.”129
As with many early fees opinions, the Hensley Court ultimately determined that the district court’s reasoning had not quite followed
the proper standards, and so the case was remanded to determine
whether the calculated fee was reasonable in light of the level of
success.130
Although the Court has not issued much additional guidance,
the Hensley rule is still in effect. In Marek v. Chesny, the Supreme
Court followed Hensley’s suggestion to disallow a portion of the
hours expended because they occurred after an offer of judgment
that ultimately exceeded the judgment obtained.131 In Farrar v.
Hobby, the Court took this rule to its logical conclusion and determined that a victory of only nominal damages would normally entitle plaintiffs’ counsel to no fee.132
124. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
125. Id. at 433 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278–79 (1st Cir.
1978)); accord Tex. State Tchrs. Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,
790–93 (1989).
126. Id. at 435.
127. Id. at 436.
128. Id. at 437.
129. Id. at 436–37.
130. Id. at 438–40.
131. Mark v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1985).
132. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114–16 (1992).
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D. The State of Practice
The preceding sections lay out the development of the lodestar
and the limits that the Supreme Court has placed on its use. An
appendix has been attached to this Article that includes a hypothetical example of the lodestar’s operation in modern practice. Two
more features of fee calculations are worth discussing to provide a
complete picture of fees litigation: the calculation of the hourly rate
and the adjustments made to hours worked.
1. Methods for Calculating the Hourly Rate
The Supreme Court in Blum built on the idea that the lodestar
was meant to approximate private fee arrangements, stating that
district court should calculate hourly rates by looking to the prevailing market rate in the relevant community.133 But the Court failed
to define the “relevant community,” instead stating in a footnote
only that “the rates charged in private representations may afford
relevant comparisons.”134 The Court placed the burden on the party
requesting fees to establish that the rate requested was “in line with
those prevailing in the community,” again without defining the relevant community.135 Circuit courts have experimented with four distinct ways of calculating the hourly rate.
Most circuits define the community broadly, with lawyers primarily differentiated by their level of experience and by the complexity of the work they engage in.136 While there are still variations
in the application of the complexity factor,137 and thus broader and
narrower approaches within this general rule, this broader-community approach is the most common among the circuits.
Other circuits, such as the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, narrow the size of the community to the specific public interest legal
communities relevant to the immediate case.138 The distinction be133. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895–96 (1984).
134. Id. at 895 n.11.
135. Id.
136. E.g., Student Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. AT&T Bell Lab’ys, 842
F.2d 1436, 1448–49 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Christensen v. Stevedoring Servs. of
Am., 557 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2009).
137. Compare Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 928 (1st Cir. 1987) (determining the
“market rate for skilled litigation services”), with Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost,
Inc., 933 F.3d 588, 575 (6th Cir. 2019) (reducing an hourly rate because the reduced
hourly rate was still above the 75th percentile for solo practitioners, above the 50th
percentile for employment lawyers, and above the 75th percentile for attorneys
with offices in the same county).
138. This distinction from the broader approach was first noted by the Third
Circuit panel in SPIRG, 842 F.2d at 1442–48 (citing Lightfoot v. Walker, 826 F.2d
516, 524 (7th Cir. 1987); Mayson v. Pierce, 806 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1987).
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tween this approach and the broader-community approach is not a
hard and fast one, but the difference is most noticeable in substantive practice areas in which large firms do not typically practice,
therefore depressing prevailing hourly rates in those practice areas.
A few circuits, most notably the Eighth and the D.C. Circuits,
have experimented with a community of one; that is, the attorney’s
own historical billing rates are the relevant community.139 The community of one is the most straightforward method of calculation.
But as an example, the D.C. Circuit, after some time applying this
rule, ultimately rejected it due to its unfairness to firms who engaged in representation that had both private sector and public interest elements, as it lowered an attorney’s billing rates despite not
reflecting their skill level or experience.140
The Second Circuit, in 2007, created a framework that it
termed the “presumptively reasonable fee,” which deviated from
the lodestar primarily in its method of calculating an hourly rate.141
The panel, which included retired Justice O’Connor sitting by designation, stated that the lodestar, as it had been applied, had “deteriorated to the point of unhelpfulness” and should no longer serve as
a starting point.142 Instead, the Second Circuit substituted the rate
calculation with a “reasonable hourly rate,” which could take the
Johnson factors into account but should be based on “the rate a
paying client would be willing to pay.”143 Although this approach
has been criticized as more subjective and problematic for lowvalue claims,144 it remains the law of the Second Circuit, similar to
but distinct from any of the above methods.145
139. E.g., Johnson v. GDF, Inc., 668 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2012); Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Cmty. v. City of Prior Lake, 771 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1985);
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled by Save
Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
140. Hodel, 857 F.2d at 1520–21. The D.C. Circuit now uses the broad definition of community, although its application of “complexity” in public interest cases
does place it toward the narrower end of that category. See Eley v. Dist. of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 103–04 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (reversing because plaintiff had failed to
carry their burden of demonstrating that the claimed rates were appropriate for
the specific type of case they brought, in this instance an IDEA case).
141. Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany,
493 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2007), amended opinion and superseded on denial of reh’g,
522 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2008).
142. Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190.
143. Id.
144. See John A. Beranbaum, Attorney Fees: The Death of Arbor Hill, 84 N.Y.
ST. BAR J. 42, 44–45 (2012).
145. See Lilly v. City of New York, 934 F.3d 222, 231–33 (2d Cir. 2019). There
is at least some argument to be made that this method is the correct application of
the Supreme Court’s repeated discussions in the 1980s that upward adjustments
were unnecessary because the hourly rate could capture almost every justification
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2. Percentage Cuts as Proxy
Given the Supreme Court’s rejection of most enhancements of
the lodestar, the “mathematical” lodestar calculation—that is, the
hours expended multiplied by the hourly rate—has functioned for
almost thirty years as a hard ceiling in the federal courts. If a judge
disallows certain hours from the calculation, there is no enhancement left to make up the difference.
Because fee awards are only reviewed for abuse of discretion,
appellate courts largely affirm district courts’ cuts to a fee award, by
definition, unless those cuts are wildly disproportionate or clearly
erroneous. Mere disagreement with the number of hours disallowed
or the ultimate size of the award is not, in and of itself, grounds for
reversal.146
As cases become increasingly complex in nature and the number of time entries for any given case skyrockets, courts have given
themselves leeway to avoid having to comb through hundreds or
thousands of pages of time entries. Instead, district courts are empowered to employ percentage cuts as opposed to identifying specific time entries to disallow.147
3. An Illustrative Calculation
Consider Ms. A, an attorney, who wins an employment discrimination case at the summary judgment stage.148 Ms. A worked
with an associate, Mr. B, on the case, and both prepared contempofor an upward adjustment. Justice O’Connor’s presence on the Arbor Hill panel
supports this argument, especially as the 1980s opinions discussed above included
her in the majority. However, this does not take away from concerns about the
administrability of this approach in particular. Id.
146. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 549 (2010) (noting
that the Eleventh Circuit had affirmed the award despite commenting that it
“would have cut the billable hours more if . . . deciding the matter in the first
instance”).
147. See, e.g., N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Child., Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d
1136, 1146 (2d Cir. 1983) (allowing a percentage cut in a case with 16,410 claimed
hours, for “[i]n similar cases with voluminous fee applications, courts have recognized that it is unrealistic to expect a trial judge to evaluate and rule on every entry
in an application”); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (allowing a 22-percent cut to stand even though no specific accounting had been performed); Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Schs., 611 F.2d 624, 636–37
(6th Cir. 1979) (endorsing a percentage deduction to eliminate duplication of services as “preferable to an attempt to pick out, here and there, the hours which
were duplicative”); abrogation in part on other grounds recognized by L & W Supply Corp. v. Acuity, 475 F.3d 737, 739–40 (6th Cir. 2007); Davis v. Bd. Of Sch.
Comm’rs of Mobile Cnty., 526 F.2d 865, 868–69 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming a 56percent cut in the hourly rate as, instead, a 56-percent cut in the hours claimed,
which “would have been justified”).
148. This calculation is also laid out in the Appendix, infra.
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raneous timesheets for their work. The case most notably involved
a series of protracted disputes at the discovery stage, and Ms. A
delegated most of the discovery requests, review, and strategy to
Mr. B. While Mr. B was able to secure all of the relevant discovery
and draft a winning summary judgment motion, he also made a few
missteps during discovery that led to additional time billed on the
case, including time spent on a few weekends before court-imposed
deadlines. As a result, some of Mr. B’s work was duplicative, and he
had to engage in some secretarial activities himself as the assigned
paralegal, Mr. C, was unavailable. Ms. A’s initial request and the
district court’s calculations and adjustments are reproduced in the
Appendix as well.
Ms. A submits a timesheet claiming 192.7 hours worked at a
rate of $460 per hour. She also submits a timesheet for Mr. B of
244.1 hours worked at a rate of $400 per hour and a timesheet for
Mr. C for 17.6 hours worked at a rate of $150 per hour. Ms. A’s
total request is therefore $188,922.
The district court identifies three problematic time entries in
Ms. A’s timesheet: a 5.4-hour entry before the filing of the complaint simply marked “Reviewed case”; a 2.6-hour entry shortly after a motion to dismiss was filed, marked “Phone call and strategy”;
and a 3.8-hour entry before the summary judgment hearing,
marked “Prep and strategy.” The district court disallows these 11.8
hours entirely from Ms. A’s request. In doing so, the district court
notices that many of Ms. A’s entries include multiple activities aggregated into a single entry, a disfavored practice called “block billing” that may make meaningful review of the timesheets difficult.149
The district court therefore reduces Ms. A’s requested hours, after
excluding the three entries, by an additional ten percent.
The district court also finds many of Mr. B’s entries blockbilled, so the district court reduces his requested hours by ten percent. The court deems Mr. B’s duplicative discovery work not “reasonably expended” and reduces Mr. B’s request by another 20
percent to account for that duplicative work and other perceived
inefficiencies. Finally, because Mr. B’s weekend work resulted in
various secretarial tasks that Mr. B had to take on himself, the court
determines that an additional ten percent of Mr. B’s work is secre149. See, e.g., Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007)
(noting that “block billing makes it more difficult to determine how much time was
spent on particular activities”); Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1215
(10th Cir. 2000) (refusing to adopt a mandatory reduction for block billing but
discussing controlling precedent that “admonishes attorneys who wish to recover
attorneys’ fees not to utilize the practice of block billing”).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\127-1\DIK103.txt

126

unknown

Seq: 26

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

25-OCT-22

11:20

[Vol. 127:101

tarial in nature and thus subject to exclusion under the circuit’s
rules. The district court thus reduces Mr. B’s requested hours by a
total of 40 percent. The district court finds Mr. C’s hours largely
reasonable, but also reduces Mr. C’s requested hours by 20 percent
due to the inclusion of some secretarial work.
The district court looks to caselaw and determines that each of
the hourly rates claimed is too high. Ms. A, as an experienced attorney, receives a rate of $425 per hour rather than $460. But for Mr.
B, a junior attorney, the court sets a rate of $295 per hour. Mr. C
receives the circuit’s standard paralegal rate of $120 per hour. The
final award, as a result of the district court’s cuts and finding of
rates, is $114,099.50.
*

*

*

Even in state courts, where the Johnson factors are largely
available to adjust a lodestar calculation upward or downward,150
the lodestar has almost universally become the starting point, if not
the endpoint, for fee analyses. The lodestar has gained acceptance
despite a task force report from the Third Circuit itself discussing
the lodestar method’s drawbacks, barely a decade after the Third
Circuit proposed the lodestar as a framework. The next Part is a
deep dive into this report, the criticisms that courts and commentators have raised over time, and the solutions proposed to address
the problems with the lodestar.
II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE
DRAWBACKS

AND THE

LODESTAR’S

The lodestar has a certain logic: In order to fairly compensate
the attorney for the work they have done, the starting point for the
calculation should be the manner in which the attorney would have
billed a private client for their work. But even without probing
whether the lodestar ultimately encourages attorneys to take feeshifting cases, the downsides of the lodestar quickly became
apparent.
A. The Task Force Report
The Third Circuit became concerned about the impact of its
lodestar framework after some practical concerns arose, and it commissioned a task force to recommend either improvements to the
150. Klaiber, supra note 81, at 245.
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Lindy formulation or an alternative method entirely.151 In 1985,
shortly after the Supreme Court decided Hensley and Blum, the
Task Force issued its report.152 The report identified nine specific
shortcomings of the Lindy formulation, condensed here into seven
categories. In the fee-shifting context, virtually all, if not all, criticisms of the lodestar that have been offered in the last 50 years fall
into one of these 7 categories.153
1. Increased Workload and Difficulty of Calculation
First, the Task Force noted that the burden of assessing fee requests largely fell upon the shoulders of district courts.154 The
Lindy formulation required “increased documentation” compared
to a pure discretion-based regime, and in particular, the advent of
“fee hearings (including the use of ‘experts’)” contributed to a
greater use of district court resources.155 Indeed, especially as litigation becomes more complex, district courts must often review
thousands of pages of time entries totaling tens of thousands, or
even hundreds of thousands of hours. Even with the use of percentage cuts,156 courts are likely to expend substantial effort simply to
apply the cuts to the appropriate claimed hours, to re-tabulate the
hours at various different rates determined by the court, and to confirm the math.157 Some scholars have estimated that federal judges
spend as much as ten percent of their time solely on fee disputes.158
2. Lack of Predictability
Despite the theoretical allure of Lindy, in practice, the lodestar
did not provide a predictable baseline for fee awards.159 The Task
Force singled out the fact that different judges regularly produced
151. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 238 (“In response to
Chief Judge Aldisert’s question, ‘If not Lindy, then what?,’ the Task Force respectfully submits the following report and recommendations.”).
152. Id.
153. The Task Force also spent considerable time attempting to address Lindy
within the context of common-fund cases, a scenario outside the scope of this
Article.
154. Id. at 246.
155. Id.
156. See supra Part I.D.2.
157. See, e.g., Pope v. Cnty. of Albany, No. 11-cv-736, 2015 WL 5510944, at
*16 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2015) (breaking out, in table form, the eight hourly rates
applied to members of the two plaintiffs’ firms, demonstrating the cuts from each
of the eight categories of hours, and the component fees awarded to arrive at a
total fee award of $1,602,886.75).
158. Silver, supra note 19, at 906–07, 907 n.156.
159. See THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 246.
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wildly divergent fee awards,160 leading to “a loss of predictability as
to treatment, as well as a loss of confidence in the integrity of the
fee-setting procedure.”161 The Task Force mentioned, as an example, that courts were far from uniform in addressing ambiguities in
the lodestar calculation, including what location’s billing market
was the proper baseline for a reasonable billing rate.162
3. False Sense of Mathematical Precision
The Task Force noted that the number that resulted from the
lodestar calculation would “feel” precise in a way that was misleading.163 The report illustrated this false sense of precision through
the example that many lawyers who work primarily on contingent
fee agreements do not typically have a customary billing rate, and
thus the setting of a customary rate was a legal fiction.164
Perhaps more directly, part of this sense of mathematical precision likely comes from the idea of significant figures, a scientific
expression of a number’s precision.165 Fee awards, despite attempts
to simplify the calculations, typically result in uneven numbers. Taking a random sample—the week of February 24, 2020—federal
courts issued fee awards of $17,100;166 $2,266,666;167 $17,808;168
$60,000,000 split 6 ways, with shares between $3,193,191.83 and
$21,943,464;169 $1,916.50;170 $179,977.80;171 and $3,937.50.172 These
awards seem more precise than round-number awards of $20,000 or
160. Id.
161. Id. at 246–47.
162. Id. at 249. The Task Force noted a circuit split on the matter of whether
the baseline should be the standard rate within the district of the reviewing court
or in the locale that the attorney typically practices in. Id. at 249 n.39. This circuit
split has now been resolved, largely due to the efforts of the Task Force. See Bywaters v. United States, 670 F.3d 1221, 1233 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (collecting cases).
163. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 247.
164. Id.
165. Significant figures indicate the degree of uncertainty in a number in scientific contexts. For example: “92.00 is different from 92: a scientist who measures
92.00 milliliters knows his value to the nearest 1/100th milliliter; meanwhile his
colleague who measured 92 milliliters only knows his value to the nearest 1 milliliter.” Chapter 5, Significant Figures, COLUM. CTR. FOR TEACHING & LEARNING,
bit.ly/3NkfBpN [https://perma.cc/A2RY-8GWV] (last visited Aug. 9, 2022).
166. Rios v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 11-cv-1592, 2020 WL 1000469, at *2
(D. Nev. Feb. 28, 2020).
167. Stevens v. SEI Inv. Co., No. 18-cv-4205, 2020 WL 996418, at *15 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 28, 2020).
168. Baker v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 19-cv-8024, 2020 WL 978729, at *5 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 28, 2020).
169. Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 512 F. Supp. 3d 196, 271
(D. Mass. 2020).
170. Morguard, LLC v. Rowe, No. 19-cv-1996, 2020 WL 1479857, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 26, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 1470967 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2020).
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$2 million. But how precise are these numbers in terms of either the
value that the attorneys brought their clients or the actual work the
attorneys put into the case? Can we say with any certainty that the
$17,808 award was for a greater value of time than the $17,100
award?
Awards specified to the cent strongly imply a degree of precision. The $3,193,191.83 award has nine significant figures, which
suggests that $3,193,191.84 would be too high and $3,193,191.82
would be too low. But even if we could estimate the actual value
derived—the calculation the lodestar method purports to replicate—that estimate would probably come with uncertainty of hundreds of thousands of dollars in each direction. Indeed, the standard
of review on appeal does not directly deal with the amount
awarded, at least in part because the conception of fair value itself
varies from judge to judge.173
4. Manipulation by Results-Oriented Judges
The Task Force noted concerns that judges were too resultsoriented in their calculations, aiming for a certain dollar amount or
percentage of the overall request.174 At least one study had indicated that certain judges were systematically awarding roughly 25
percent of the underlying damages award in all cases, regardless of
the hours worked, type of case, amount of recovery, or any other
factor.175
Indeed, the typical deliberative process of a judge encourages
this results-oriented thinking, even if it is not malicious in nature.
Consider, for example, a judge addressing a substantial fee motion
at the end of a civil rights case. The judge sets an hourly rate, disallows some portion of hours, and runs the calculation. Perhaps they
end up with a number that they feel is too low. They know that an
enhancement for performance or for contingency is not available to
them, so instead, they look to the hourly rate to see if they can
justify an increase there. If not, perhaps the judge decides to take a
171. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, Ind. State Dep’t of
Health, No. 16-cv-763, 2020 WL 906273, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 25, 2020).
172. Johnson v. Johnson, No. 17-cv-4840, 2020 WL 901517, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 25, 2020).
173. See supra Part II.A.2; cf. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 549 (“The [Eleventh Circuit] held that the District Court had not abused its discretion . . . but the panel
commented that it ‘would have cut the billable hours more if we were deciding the
matter in the first instance’ . . . .”).
174. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 247.
175. Id. at 247 n.31.
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closer look at the hours they disallowed to see if the percentage cuts
were too large or the invalidation of hours too punitive.
Or perhaps the calculated number seems too high. The judge
may think that a fee award larger than the damages, such as the
award in Zastrow, is absurd. Or perhaps, with a governmental defendant, the judge wishes to avoid wasting public money. But there
is no occasion for a Hensley-style cut in the number of hours for
limited success. Instead, the judge goes searching for other cuts.
Perhaps the five-percent cut for overbilling becomes a ten-percent
cut. Perhaps the judge identifies an additional cut for conference
calls or a similar practice other judges have criticized in the past.
The judge knows that the more it looks like they scrutinized the
record closely, the less likely it is that the appeals court questions
their ultimate award number.
Again, this manipulation does not have to be malicious. But it
can still lead to patterns that lack any direct correlation to the value
of the attorney’s time. And aside from the most egregious cases,
such as the 25 percent example above, it is impossible to tell
whether a judge was aiming for a particular number based solely on
the cuts and adjustments they carried out.
5. Perverse Incentives for Attorneys
The Task Force noted that plaintiffs’ lawyers had recognized
the benefit of “running the meter” so as to inflate their fee awards
in the decade since Lindy.176 Even after accounting for likely percentage cuts and disallowed hours, the general assumption is that
an inflated fee request will result in a larger fee award than a bythe-book request. The Task Force also recognized that maximizing
the number of hours included in the lodestar calculation was a
strong disincentive for the early settlement of cases.177
6. Limited Flexibility in Discretion
To build off of the previous point, judges often interpret the
efficient administration of justice as encouraging speedy resolution,
including settlement, of cases.178 But despite the wide latitude
courts are given in finding an appropriate number of hours worked
and a reasonable hourly rate, the lodestar itself does not provide an
176. Id. at 248.
177. Id.
178. E.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (noting a “clear policy of
favoring settlement of all lawsuits”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (encouraging the
“just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of each case).
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easy method for courts to advance these objectives.179 The Task
Force did not have a ready answer here: “On the other hand,
greater discretion is likely to exacerbate the lack of [predictability]
and contribute to the concerns of the public interest bar . . . .”180
7. Disadvantages for Public Interest Attorneys
Hourly rates are typically lower for civil rights cases than they
are for “the so-called ‘money’ cases, such as securities and antitrust
actions.”181 A plausible explanation for this discrepancy is that civil
rights cases often seek nonmonetary relief, and proper compensation for time reasonably expended may appear to dwarf the actual
relief obtained.182 For judges who see the result of their initial calculation and feel that the recovery is too high, the hourly rate is an
easy place to adjust downward, and once the lower rate is in the
caselaw, it can perpetuate indefinitely. The Task Force recognized
that there was at least some reluctance among attorneys to accept
civil rights cases due to low award amounts.183
B. The Third Circuit Task Force’s Recommendations
The Task Force recommended preserving the lodestar for statutory fee-shifting cases.184 However, the Task Force recognized
many of the lodestar’s shortcomings and suggested three major reforms that might improve the administration of lodestar calculations, although it recognized that Blum in particular might limit the
flexibility available to courts in implementing their suggestions.185
The first reform the Task Force suggested was to set a uniform
hourly rate schedule in each district so that parties would not have
to engage in fees litigation on the hourly rate portion of the calculation.186 Although the Task Force preferred a single rate for all legal
work, it recognized the value of differentiating at least by experience, and so suggested a simple experience-based table that would
be “uniformly applied to all lawyers and in all cases.”187 The Task
179. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 248.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 248–49.
183. Id. at 249.
184. Id. at 259.
185. Id. at 259–60. Two other major reforms were suggested, but one has since
been mooted by the Supreme Court and the other was a suggestion to apply all
reforms equally. Id. at 265–70.
186. Id. at 260.
187. Id. at 260–61. The Task Force did believe that a district court should retain the power to deviate in an exceptional case, but only in an exceptional case.
Id. at 261–62.
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Force therefore recommended that the Third Circuit adopt the “forum rule”: Courts should generally set rates based on the location
of the litigation, except when “the special expertise of counsel from
a distant district” is necessary or local counsel is unwilling to handle
the case.188 The Task Force concluded that the gains in objectivity
and efficiency would offset the potential overpayment or underpayment that might result.189
Second, the Task Force suggested that encouraging discussion
of fees as early in the litigation as possible would be useful, recommending mechanisms similar to current case management conferences under Rule 16 or Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.190 Establishing a benchmark number or range at an
early stage in the litigation might discourage “excessive discovery
or any other lawyer hyperactivity.”191 Although judges would retain
their full power to address individual time entries at the fee litigation stage, an earlier understanding of a case’s fee award potential
might encourage both plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel to
treat settlement more realistically.192
Third, the Task Force suggested eliminating the performance
multiplier and mandating the contingency multiplier.193 The performance multiplier would be implicitly accounted for by the hourly
rate schedule described above, and its elimination would remove
the potential for its discriminatory application.194 However, in statutory fee cases, “[p]laintiffs’ attorneys always face the prospect of
receiving no compensation.”195 Even if the enhancement were minimal in most cases, mandating application of the contingency multiplier would best capture the actual incentive that an attorney would
have to take a case.196
The Task Force also noted that courts would be prudent to consider two timing factors, although they did not frame these as fullfledged recommendations. First, the delay in receiving fees, which
might merit either interest or an award at current hourly rates
188. Id. at 261 (quoting Polk v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 722 F.2d 23,
25 (2d Cir. 1983)).
189. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 261.
190. Id. at 262.
191. Id. at 263.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 264–65.
194. Id. at 265.
195. Id.
196. Id. The Supreme Court’s subsequent rejection of the contingency multiplier, which made this recommendation impossible for judges to implement on
their own, is discussed above in Part I.C.2.
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rather than at historical rates.197 Second, any influence that the fee
applicant had on the slow resolution of the case, so that any indication of delay by the applicant in an attempt to inflate the lodestar
calculation would be grounds for a reduced award.198
The Third Circuit did ultimately adopt the forum rule recommended by the Task Force, although the court did not speak unambiguously on the issue for some years.199 But the Third Circuit did
not adopt any of the three major reforms in full. The Supreme
Court’s rejection of the contingency multiplier rendered the Task
Force’s third major reform impossible for judges to implement, and
widespread adoption of rate schedules200 and fee discussions at case
management conferences have not yet occurred.
C. Other Proposed Solutions
A wide range of other options have been proposed in the last
several decades.201 A common starting point for scholarly commentary is the Task Force’s conclusion that “[e]arly, frank discussion of
fee matters . . . should have the salutary effects of identifying
problems at the outset and improving the process’ predictability
should plaintiffs prevail.”202
197. Id. at 265.
198. Id.
199. See Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 704–05
(3d Cir. 2005) (adopting the forum rule by invoking the Task Force report).
200. See, e.g., Harrell v. City of New York, No. 14-cv-7246, 2017 WL 9538163,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2017) (“The reality is that courts in this District have approved a wide range of rates for attorneys engaged in civil rights work. As has
often been noted, ‘[p]recedent in the Southern District of New York demonstrates
that a reasonable hourly rate for a civil rights attorney can range from $250 to
$650’ . . . .”) (quoting Coakley v. Webb, No. 14-cv-8438, 2016 WL 1047079, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016)).
201. One obvious but ultimately irrelevant outlier is Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82, which explicitly provides for an award-taxing scheme for both plaintiffs
and defendants. Rule 82 states that the prevailing party in a civil case, upon motion, “shall be awarded attorney’s fees calculated under this rule.” ALASKA. R.
CIV. P. 82(a). The rule then provides a rate schedule in a case with a monetary
award and states that in cases with no monetary award, the fees are set at a proportion of “the prevailing party’s reasonable actual attorney’s fees which were necessarily incurred.” ALASKA. R. CIV. P. 82(b)(1)–(2). The calculation is allowed to be
adjusted based on 11 enumerated factors which largely resemble the Johnson factors. ALASKA. R. CIV. P. 82(b)(3). Oddly, despite the seeming wide effect that this
rule should have, only about 10 percent of civil cases result in an award of Rule 82
fees, and most attorneys stated that Rule 82 was only a minor consideration in the
way that litigation proceeded. Susanne Di Pietro, The English Rule at Work in
Alaska, 80 JUDICATURE 88, 89 (1996). Because this award is explicitly designed to
only partially compensate an attorney, and because Rule 82 yields to other feeshifting statutes in Alaska law, it has little practical import as a solution here.
202. THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 262.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\127-1\DIK103.txt

134

unknown

Seq: 34

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

25-OCT-22

11:20

[Vol. 127:101

One such proposal would require the plaintiff to submit a fee
arrangement with their complaint, after agreeing upon one with
their attorney. Any defense objections to the reasonableness of the
arrangement would be referred to a special magistrate at an early
stage in the litigation.203 The magistrate would make every effort to
have the parties resolve the issue themselves, but would occasionally step in to reduce an award if a defendant could demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that a reduction was warranted.204
Once the issue was resolved, whether by the magistrate or by the
parties, the agreement reached would govern the ultimate award of
fees and, if an hourly fee structure was chosen, the magistrate
would hear any disputes over claimed hours after the litigation concluded.205 A similar proposal suggests that rather than allow the
plaintiff and plaintiff’s attorney flexibility, a brief hearing with a
special master should simply set an hourly rate for counsel at the
outset of litigation.206
Other proposals fiddle with the calculation rather than the timing. One commentator has called on the Supreme Court to promote
predictability by explicitly disavowing the Johnson factors as potential adjustments to the lodestar calculation.207 Another has stated
that a defendant’s challenge to a plaintiff’s hours should identify
specific time entries, and that a plaintiff should be required to justify the specified time entries or concede them, leaving the judge a
clear record of time entries that require resolution.208
Another proposal insists that contingency fee frameworks be
considered as an alternate method of calculation, either in every
case as a lodestar alternative or specifically in cases where counsel
has entered into a contingent fee agreement with their client.209 Although this alternative creates extra work, the argument is that it
more closely approximates a practice area where contingent fee
agreements are common.210
These are all admirable proposals to tackle a difficult issue.
And it is clear that something must be done. But many of these
203. Silver, supra note 19, at 901–07.
204. Id. at 904.
205. Id. at 904–06.
206. Klaiber, supra note 81, at 255.
207. Kristin A.C. Olin, Comment, Unreasonable Calculations of “Reasonable”
Fees: Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn and the Supreme Court’s Ongoing Struggle
with 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1113, 1130–31 (2011).
208. Klaiber, supra note 81, at 257–58.
209. See George Murr, Analysis of the Valuation of Attorney Work Product
According to the Market for Claims: Reformulating the Lodestar Method, 31 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 599, 633–36 (2000).
210. Id. at 637.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\127-1\DIK103.txt

2022]

unknown

NAVIGATING BEYOND

THE

Seq: 35

25-OCT-22

LODESTAR

11:20

135

proposals are designed to address one concern of fee-shifting by
exacerbating another, often judicial workload. Proposals for the
parties to create a specific record of contested time entries might
save a judge from combing through voluminous records. But these
proposals simply shift the work from the judge to the defendant,
resulting in the exact same “second major litigation” that the Supreme Court discouraged.211 And these proposals do not save the
judge from having to rule on each of these objections, potentially
creating more work than the current percentage-cut scheme does.
And an early-stage hearing on the question of fees not only results
in the same second major litigation, but also forces that second major litigation in cases when the plaintiff may not prevail at all.
Considering contingent fees would require the court to engage
in a second onerous calculation. And disavowing the Johnson factors would simplify the calculation, but it would also exacerbate the
influence of an attorney trying to maximize their fee award by
overbilling. And perhaps more importantly, none of these proposals is designed to address most, let alone all of the concerns about
fee shifting identified by the Task Force report. For example, after
implementing almost any of these reforms, the incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to bill heavily and prolong litigation would still exist.
In the next Part, this Article argues that an examination of the
use of discretion in the framework, and of our understanding of
discretion itself, is the key to finding a solution that will be both fair
and administrable.
III. IN SEARCH

OF

PREDICTABILITY: DEGREES

OF

DISCRETION

A. The Legal Fiction of the Lodestar Mirroring the Market
Given the legislative history of fee-shifting statutes,212 it is curious that judges, practitioners, and commentators uniformly insist on
calculating fees in a way that mirrors the operation of the market.
The fee-shifting mechanisms exist because the market has failed to
encourage enforcement of these laws. Bringing a negative-value
claim is inherently non-economic in nature.
211. Further, this only works if current practice results in overbroad and careless objections by defendants. Carefully reasoned and judicious objections should,
at least in theory, look similar to the responses that defendants already file. And if
in practice defense objections to fee requests are already overly broad, this mechanism does not meaningfully discourage defense objections from being similarly
broad.
212. See supra Part I.A.
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Four methods of calculating hourly rates were discussed in Part
I.213 But if we assume that we are setting hourly rates for an area of
law that largely produces negative-value claims, three of those four
methods require data from prior fee-shifting awards in order to
work. Only defining the relevant community by location and complexity, the first method discussed above, allows for an attorney
specializing in negative-value claims to logically calculate a rate
from first principles. The approaches based on market rates in the
attorney’s practice area and on the attorney’s prior billing rates
must draw from other awards for negative-value claims in order to
arrive at a number. And the “reasonable hourly rate” is based on
“the rate a paying client would be willing to pay,”214 which logically
caps the fee award at the level of the monetary recovery.
Do these attempts to approximate the market make sense?
Courts have managed to muddle through with them, but the insistence on finding fixes and workarounds within this framework directly creates many of the issues outlined by the Third Circuit Task
Force.
What’s more, the market that the lodestar tries to approximate
may not even exist. Contingent-fee arrangements are and have
been common for the entire duration of the lodestar’s existence. In
addition, the billable hour appears to be on its way out. Although
most firms still retain hourly billing in certain contexts or for certain
clients, 94 percent of firms reported using some form of non-hourly
billing for some clients as early as 2010.215
If the lodestar has to engage in economic fictions to work, and
the economic fictions are no longer accurate, the lodestar’s present
value is limited, even if the lodestar is consistent with the legislative
intent of fee-shifting statutes. But the lodestar does not even fulfill
the stated purpose of those statutes: to encourage enforcement of
certain rights.
Under the lodestar framework, there is still considerable risk
for plaintiffs’ attorneys taking on fee-shifting cases, due to the potential reductions that the court could assess years into the future.
213. See supra Part I.D.
214. Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany,
493 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2007), amended and superseded on denial of reh’g by Arbor
Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182 (2d
Cir. 2008).
215. Ellen Freedman, Alternative Fee Arrangements: Not a Passing Fad, 39
PA. LAW. 30, 31 (2017); see also Steven T. Taylor, Alternative Fee Spending Spikes
as Some Firms Embrace Change, 35 OF COUNS. 1, 1 (2016) (noting $21.3 billion in
legal fees assessed through alternative fee arrangements other than contingent or
hourly billed fees).
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When an attorney decides to take on a representation covered by a
fee-shifting statute, the lodestar’s allowance of only downward adjustments216 creates an expectation that the attorney will ultimately
be somewhat undercompensated for their time. And given that the
Supreme Court has deemed upward adjustments for contingency
impermissible, the only way for an attorney to account for that risk
is by inflating their initial fee request. In a system such as this, uncertainty is unavoidable.
B. Degrees of Discretion
At its heart, the problem with the lodestar is one of discretion.
Attorneys have the discretion to adjust their billing practices to
maximize their initial request, and judges have the discretion to use
percentage cuts to arrive at almost any award. The supposed elegance of the lodestar method has been swallowed by the adjustments, and the adjustments are almost as standardless as the
Johnson factors. Indeed, in the Fifth Circuit, where Zastrow’s case
arose, the Johnson factors are explicitly used to adjust the lodestar
calculation.217 These adjustments ensure that substantial unpredictability is baked into the process.
Judges have three different opportunities to adjust the numbers as they see fit: (1) adjusting the total number of hours worked,
(2) adjusting the hourly rate, and even (3) adjusting the total after
multiplication.218 These options are three separate degrees of discretion219 that a judge can introduce individually or in combination.
Think of them as three separate numerical sliders that a judge is
allowed to move up and down until the judge reaches a result that
they think makes sense.
216. See supra Part I.C.
217. Zastrow, 695 F. App’x at 779.
218. Even if the fee-shifting statute does not allow a contingency enhancement, judges retain the ability to adjust downward as discussed in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
219. Modeled off of degrees of freedom, a term in use in numerous scientific
contexts but referring generally to the number of independent variables that can
change while remaining within the constraints of the system. See, e.g., Anascape,
Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (describing the
six standard degrees of freedom as they relate to movement through space); Renishaw P.L.C. v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni, 974 F. Supp. 1056, 1064–65 (E.D.
Mich. 1997) (describing the six standard degrees of freedom as they relate to
movement though space); Degrees of Freedom: What Are They?, STAT. HOW TO,
https://bit.ly/3PhV85P [https://perma.cc/6FLD-F4EJ] (“Degrees of freedom of an
estimate is the number of independent pieces of information that went into calculating the estimate.”) (last visited Aug. 9, 2022).
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Having multiple sliders can be useful, if some or all of them are
reasonably constrained and the differences in the final result are
easily traceable to one of the three sliders. A framework that has
reasonable constraints can be both predictable and reviewable on
appeal. But aside from the ceiling the Supreme Court has set, the
judge has nearly absolute control over the sliders in the fees context, which means they can freely rely on any of these adjustments
for any cut that they can justify subjectively.
The availability of percentage cuts exacerbates this problem.
Percentage cuts might be necessary to ensure that courts do not get
bogged down in reviewing individual time entries, but if courts do
not actually have to identify time entries to adjust hours worked,
moving those sliders becomes much easier for judges.
The Third Circuit Task Force identified this issue, at least indirectly, in discussing the follies of “results-oriented judges.”220 But
the Task Force did not take the next step: identifying why these
three degrees of discretion were granted to courts in the first place.
This wide toolbox of adjustments only exists because the plaintiff’s
attorney, rather than the judge, sets the baseline for the fee inquiry:
the total number of hours worked and the requested hourly rate.
There are essentially no constraints on the plaintiff’s initial fee request, meaning that the lodestar method necessarily begins with variability and unpredictability at its heart. And the only way for the
judge to counteract that variability is with more variability. In a system with any consistent starting point, such a complex system of
adjustments would not be necessary. And although the hope is that
the judge could appropriately create consistency from case to case
with the sliders they retain, doing so would be difficult enough in a
simpler system. The initial variability, on top of the lengthy time
between cases and the numerous circumstantial differences, makes
it virtually impossible.
C. Reducing Degrees of Discretion by Unchaining Fees from
Hours Worked
The use of a self-reported number of hours as the starting point
for every calculation renders predictability impossible. Instead, a
more consistent starting point would simplify all aspects of the calculation process and simultaneously encourage greater enforcement
of civil rights statutes governed by fee shifting.
Standardizing that starting point likely would allow the courts
to condense their discretion, or at least make exercises of that dis220. See supra Part II.A.4.
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cretion more reviewable. Fee awards will always need some freedom for adjustment, as no two cases are ever the same, and some
are wildly different. But courts might not need more than one degree of discretion to properly adjust the fee award to a satisfactory
level, as long as the courts start from a robust baseline.
The Supreme Court’s prohibition on the contingency multiplier, and other similar quirks of caselaw, can even be preserved in
this new hypothetical framework.221 A more useful change for
plaintiffs’ attorneys would be to provide a clearer minimum bound
for fees. Doing so would create welcome predictability for all parties involved, especially if it would regularize the starting point of
any calculation.
Notably, the panel in Lindy implied that they were creating the
lodestar method based on necessity, stating that this baseline was
“the only reasonably objective basis for valuing an attorney’s services.”222 But in the present day, we have the benefit of something
that the Third Circuit in 1973 and the Third Circuit Task Force in
1985 did not have: several decades of experience with the lodestar.223 And the caselaw created in the meantime can be used to set
a more predictable baseline for fee awards that is not dependent on
the billing practices of the plaintiff’s attorney.
D. Who Benefits from Predictability?
1. Plaintiffs’ Attorneys
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are often disadvantaged in the context of
fee shifting. Although the lodestar is generally the law of the land,
many judges balk at fee awards that are similar in size to, or perhaps even larger than, the monetary recovery of the plaintiff. But
these negative-value claims, where the attorneys’ fees are likely to
be greater than the potential recovery, are precisely the cases for
which attorneys must be compensated properly if we endorse the
legislative history of the fee-shifting statutes. The legislative history
221. Reinstating that contingency multiplier, even if it worked properly in
practice, would likely only address cases in which the plaintiff lost altogether,
rather than cases in which the plaintiff won but had a fee award reduced. And it
would still likely leave plaintiffs’ attorneys with a substantial risk when assessing a
representation unless the chances of a low fee were curtailed.
222. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973).
223. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics
and Expertise, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1608–13 (2016) (discussing the data-driven
tweaks to the Sentencing Guidelines being made over the last decade and other
areas where data can inform adjustments to the Sentencing Guidelines).
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insists that attorneys should not be deterred from taking meritorious cases due to the risk of a meager fee recovery.
A predictable baseline for fee awards removes substantial uncertainty from an attorney’s decision to take a meritorious case at
its inception. If the attorney knows the approximate value of the
case ahead of time, these cases are easier for the attorney to accept,
and they can sustain an attorney or firm’s practice. Attorneys can
specialize more sustainably in the litigation that fee-shifting statutes
are meant to encourage. These developments in turn allow attorneys to build expertise and become more effective in enforcing
plaintiffs’ rights.
2. Plaintiffs
The ability of plaintiffs’ attorneys to take negative-value claims
clearly benefits plaintiffs. Plaintiffs with negative-value claims are
more likely to find attorneys willing to represent them under this
predictable scheme. Legal communities with this expertise will also
lead to higher visibility and more opportunities for outreach to
plaintiffs who are unaware their claims exist. And to the extent that
creating a more predictable fee framework generates more cases,
this threat may cause a potential defendant to take more care ahead
of time and may deter them from the conduct giving rise to the
claims in the first place.224
3. Defendants
While it may seem counterintuitive at first, a more predictable
fee structure also benefits defendants. For the defendant, a standardized calculation ensures that the extent to which the other
party can run up fees is limited. This backstop allows the defendant
to better understand the potential liability they might face and
make litigation decisions, or even compliance decisions, with more
information.
Consider: In statutory fee-shifting cases, the purpose of the fee
award is expressly not to punish the party liable for fees.225 However, given the wide disparity of current legal practices, a prospective plaintiff’s choice of lawyer might significantly influence the
ultimate fee award. If a plaintiff chooses a large firm to represent
224. Cf. NAT’L INST. OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, FIVE THINGS
ABOUT DETERRENCE (2016), bit.ly/3yh5n5f [https://perma.cc/X59V-J69V] (noting
in the criminal context that the certainty of consequences has a far greater effect
on deterrence than the severity of the consequences).
225. E.g., Milwe v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Perez v.
Univ. of P.R., 600 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1979)).
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them, the defendant may ultimately be on the hook for a fee award
several times larger than if the plaintiff had chosen a solo practitioner, even if the firm’s litigation strategies were similar to the solo
practitioner.
In addition, defendants benefit from the weakening of perverse
incentives that discourage plaintiffs’ attorneys from settling. To the
extent that early settlement can be more easily encouraged, a defendant’s potential exposure to large fee awards also decreases. A
defendant should therefore welcome additional predictability in the
fee-setting context.
4. Judges
Judges, by some estimation, spend ten percent of their time
and resources on fee requests.226 Any regime that reduces this proportion frees up judges and clerks to work on other matters. In particular, if a judge no longer has to consult voluminous time records
to rule on a fee request, the amount of time spent on these requests
may be reduced to a tiny fraction of judges’ current efforts.
E. Why Lodestar Tweaks Fail
In this context, it becomes clearer why the alternatives proposed in the literature do not solve the problem. Simply addressing
the hourly rate at the outset of litigation does not fix the inherent
problem with allowing the plaintiff’s attorney to set the baseline
and then giving the judge discretion to adjust that baseline. Disallowing consideration of the Johnson factors without addressing the
variability of the baseline might even worsen the lack of predictability in the current system and deter plaintiffs’ attorneys from taking
the cases Congress meant to encourage them to take. And considering a contingent fee arrangement as an alternative is also unhelpful,
at least for negative-value claims.
The problem, and thus the solution, lies deeper. But the federal
courts already have some experience in taking a regime with nearly
unfettered discretion and providing more constraints while preserving limited discretion.
IV. THE FEDERAL FEES COMMISSION: A SENTENCING FORMAT
FOR FEES
To set a predictable baseline for fee requests, a standardized
calculation is necessary. But that standardized calculation must al226. Silver, supra note 19, at 906–07, 907 n.156.
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low a judge to retain at least one degree of discretion to adjust the
award upward or downward to account for external factors. A system like this already exists in federal practice: the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Creating a Guidelines-style system for fee awards
would finally solve the puzzle of fairness and predictability while
also curbing the sprawl of fees litigation.
A. An Overview of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
1. Purpose of the Federal Sentencing Commission
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were the product of the
Federal Sentencing Commission, an agency created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.227 The goal of the Commission was to replace a regime where federal judges had virtually unfettered
discretion to sentence within the statutory ranges. The Commission
sought to create a framework that provided more predictability
while still allowing judges some level of discretion.228 The original
members of the Commission studied early guidelines experiments
in places like Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Washington,229 and
they analyzed more than 10,000 federal sentences in order to create
a series of guidelines that approximated the average sentencing
practice at the time.230
The Guidelines, and any subsequent amendments, are approved by Congress and thus have the force of law,231 although they
are advisory in nature.232 The Sentencing Commission has published periodic amendments to the Guidelines, which now number
over 800,233 although plenty of concern remains as to whether the
Commission is sufficiently responsive to changing attitudes.234
227. Brent E. Newton & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The History of the Original
United States Sentencing Commission, 1985–1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167,
1183–87 (2017).
228. Id. at 1169–76.
229. Id. at 1197.
230. Id. at 1198–99. However, in certain areas where the Commission believed that sentence lengths should increase, they adjusted the Guideline calculations accordingly. Id. at 1272–74.
231. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 393–94 (1989).
232. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
233. Policymaking, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, bit.ly/3Ab6hlj [https://perma.cc/
M9GC-J9WM] (last visited Aug. 7, 2022).
234. For example, practitioners and scholars have decried the specific offense
enhancements for child pornography as outdated and unmoored from facts for a
decade, but no reform has occurred as of February 2021. See e.g., TROY STABENOW, DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTH OF CAREFUL STUDY: A PRIMER ON THE
FLAWED PROGRESSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES (2009); Jelani
Jefferson Exum, Making the Punishment Fit the (Computer) Crime: Rebooting Notions of Possession for the Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography Offenses, 16
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2. Initial Calculation: Careful Guidance
The Sentencing Guidelines, much like the lodestar, are geared
toward an initial calculation that combines two numbers. For the
Sentencing Guidelines, these numbers are the offense level and the
criminal history category. But, unlike the lodestar, these two numbers exist on finite scales with discrete steps. Currently, the offense
level for a conviction can range from 1 to 43,235 and there are 6
criminal history categories. This structure results in a sentencing table that makes it easy to look up any combination of offense level
and criminal history category to identify a preliminary sentencing
range.236
The Sentencing Guidelines are split into eight chapters, three
of which (Chapters 2–4) are directly relevant to the calculation.237
Chapter 2 is by far the most voluminous, making up over half of the
Guidelines’ total page count.238 Chapter 2 sets the offense level for
59 separate types of offenses, distilling hundreds of criminal statutes
into broader categories.239 A description of Section 2K2.1, which
addresses firearms possession and transfer offenses, may be instructive for present purposes.240
Subsection (a) of each section of Chapter 2 sets out the possible base offense levels for the crime described using various broad
distinctions. In the case of Section 2K2.1, there are 8 possible base
offense levels ranging from 6 all the way up to 26, largely depending
on the defendant’s criminal history and the type of firearm involved.241 Subsection (b) then sets out “Specific Offense Characteristics,” which can increase or decrease the offense level based on
more specific facts that may be present or absent in a defendant’s
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, 12–25 (collecting judicial objections to the operation of the
relevant child pornography guidelines).
235. Calculations may result in an offense level greater than 43, but the
Guideline sentence for a conviction carrying an offense level of 43 or greater is life.
See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2016).
236. See id.
237. Chapter one outlines the general principles of the Guidelines, Chapter
five discusses the types of sentences available to judges, Chapter six discusses general sentencing procedures, Chapter seven discusses violations of supervised release, and Chapter eight discusses sentencing of organizations. See U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL (2016).
238. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL (2018)
(spanning from pages 50–344).
239. See id.
240. As stated in the commentary, this covers virtually all federal firearm possession statutes, including not only provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 and 924, but also
18 U.S.C. §§ 1715 and 2332g and 26 U.S.C. § 5861. Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. Statutory
Provisions.
241. See id. § 2K2.1(a).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\127-1\DIK103.txt

144

unknown

Seq: 44

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

25-OCT-22

11:20

[Vol. 127:101

case.242 For example, if the firearm was used in connection with another offense, that merits a 4-level increase in the offense level and,
if the resulting offense level is below 18, an increase to level 18.243
Section 2K2.1 also includes a Subsection (c), which discusses instances in which a different guideline’s provisions should be used—
for example, if death resulted, the homicide guideline should be
used if the resulting guideline range would be higher than the result
under Section 2K2.1.244 Each Chapter 2 guideline comes with extensive commentary, typically devoted to defining terms245 and providing additional guidance on how to apply specific offense
characteristics.246
Chapter 3 discusses potential adjustments to the offense level
calculated in Chapter 2 for non-offense-specific reasons. This includes adjustments for role in the offense,247 obstruction,248 and acceptance of responsibility,249 but it also includes a detailed process
for merging the offense levels of multiple counts into a single combined offense level.250
Chapter 4 determines a defendant’s criminal history. Each
prior conviction is generally assigned one, two, or three points
based on the length of sentence imposed,251 unless the conviction is
either too old or too minor to qualify.252 A defendant also receives
two points if they were under supervision at the time of the offense.253 These points are combined and then distilled into a criminal history category.254
For example, consider a defendant, Mr. A, who recently served
13 months in state custody for a drug trafficking felony, is out on
parole, and has several convictions from 20 to 25 years ago. Mr. A is
stopped on the street for suspected drug activity, and the police
242. See id. § 2K2.1(b).
243. Id. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
244. Id. § 2K2.1(c)(1)(B).
245. See id. § 2K2.1 cmts. 1–3.
246. Id. § 2K2.1 cmts. 5–6, 8–9, 13–14. Although the commentary to the
Guidelines is often treated as definitive, some jurisdictions have determined that
because they are not reviewed by Congress, they cannot supersede contradictory
provisions of the Guidelines themselves. See United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382,
386–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
247. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 238, §§ 3B1.1–.2.
248. See id. § 3C1.1.
249. Id. § 3E1.1.
250. See id. §§ 3D1.1–.5.
251. Id. § 4A1.1.
252. See id. § 4A1.2.
253. See id. § 4A1.1(d).
254. Provisions for special cases such as career offender status under
§§ 4B1.1–.5 are not relevant to the question of fees and are thus not covered here.
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frisk him for safety. They find a handgun with a scratched-off serial
number in Mr. A’s jacket, and he is charged and pleads guilty to
being a felon in possession of a firearm.255 Because of Mr. A’s prior
conviction for a controlled substance felony, his base offense level
is 20.256 The 2-level enhancement for an obliterated serial number
applies, raising his total offense level to 22.257 But Mr. A pleads
guilty and receives a 3-level reduction in his offense level, resulting
in a final offense level of 19.258
As for Mr. A’s criminal history, his recent 13-month sentence
on the prior drug trafficking felony receives 2 criminal history
points.259 But his older convictions are too old to qualify.260 However, since Mr. A was still on parole when police found him with
the gun, two criminal history points are added.261 This results in a
total criminal history score of four, which is a criminal history category III.262 An offense level of 19 and a criminal history category of
III, according to the current version of the Sentencing Table, result
in a Guideline-range sentence of 37 to 46 months.263
3. Sentencing Discretion: Departures and Variances
The voluminous guidance provided by the Sentencing Guidelines does not mean that courts lack discretion in calculating the
Guideline range. If a judge determines that a case is atypical and
“falls outside the ‘heartland’ to which the United States Sentencing
Commission intends each individual guideline to apply,” they can
impose a departure, either full or partial, from that Guideline provision.264 A departure does not directly shift a defendant’s sentence;
instead, it shifts the entire Guideline range from what was initially
calculated. In addition to these departures, courts may impose variances, where the sentence pronounced is outside the post-departure
Guideline range.265
For example, a sentencing judge could use Mr. A’s lack of
criminal history for 20 years or the relatively minor offense conduct
on his drug offense to determine that category III would “substan255. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
256. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 238, § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
257. Id. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B).
258. See id. §§ 3E1.1(a)–(b).
259. Id. § 4A1.1(b).
260. See id. § 4A1.2(e).
261. Id. § 4A1.1(d).
262. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 235, ch. 5, pt. A.
263. Id.
264. United States v. Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 344 (2007) (quoting U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(2) (2005)).
265. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
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tially over-represent[ ]” Mr. A’s criminal history.266 This determination would allow the court to depart downward to criminal history
category II, which would result in a new Guideline range of 33 to 41
months.267 Or, in the alternative, the sentencing judge could simply
vary downward to impose a below-Guideline sentence of 33
months, based on any mitigating factors the judge identifies on the
record. In the fiscal year 2019, roughly half of all sentences were
within the original Guideline range, with the remaining half split
roughly evenly between departures and variances.268
4. Appellate Review
Appellate review of criminal sentences is cabined into two related but distinct inquiries: procedural reasonableness and substantive reasonableness.269 These inquiries are subject to the abuse of
discretion standard shared by fee awards, but their scope is different. Procedural reasonableness focuses on the accuracy of the
guideline calculations, whether the court considered improper factors, and the sufficiency of the explanation for the sentence imposed.270 Substantive reasonableness focuses on the actual length of
the sentence, the totality of the circumstances, and whether any variance from the Guideline range (or any non-variance) was justifiable given the facts of the case.271 As a general matter, most circuits
require a defendant to object at the sentencing hearing with some
particularity, or the arguments will be subject to plain error
review.272
B. The Federal Fees Guidelines
The Sentencing Guidelines are the subject of many critiques.
They may unfairly disempower judges to make difficult fact-based
decisions about sentencing.273 They may not actually eliminate bias
266. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 238, § 4A1.3(b)(1).
267. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 235, ch. 5, pt. A.
268. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 84 (2019). Only about 0.5 percent of cases resulted in an upward departure and 2 percent resulted in an upward variance. Id.
The rest were all downward departures and variances. Id.
269. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256–57 (3d Cir.
2014) (en banc); United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872–73 (6th Cir. 2004).
273. See, e.g., James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring
Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. ECON. 271, 302 (1999) (“By giving prior actors (law enforcement officials, probation officers, and prosecutors) more influence over the ultimate
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from the system.274 Regardless, guidelines make sense for fees in a
way that they might not for criminal sentencing. Again, the purpose
of each endeavor informs this distinction.
Criminal sentencing is meant to be an individualized determination, one that takes relevant aggravating and mitigating facts into
account.275 Whether or not these facts are accounted for in the
Guidelines calculation, a judge is required by statute to consider
over a dozen other factors, which include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the
defendant; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide
just punishment for the offense; (4) the need to afford adequate
deterrence to criminal conduct and to protect the public from further crimes; and (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment.276
The Guidelines are inherently in tension with these goals of
sentencing. They tend to reduce variation between individuals,
whether or not that is desirable.277 But in the fee-setting context,
reducing variation is consistent with the goals of the underlying feeshifting statutes. The ability to expect a certain level of compensation, rather than an inscrutable maze of adjustments, is therefore
valuable in the context of calculating fees even when that same predictability may not make sense in the context of a criminal defendant’s liberty. As a result, a Guidelines-style framework serves the
purpose of fee-shifting statutes even more effectively than it serves
the purposes of criminal sentencing.
sentence, the Guidelines provide opportunities for these earlier actors to pursue
their own agendas that did not exist pre-Guidelines.”); Don J. DeBenedictis, How
Long is Too Long?, 79 A.B.A. J. 74, 74, 79 (1993) (“Seventy-six percent of federal
judges, compared to 59 percent of state judges, think sentencing guidelines give
prosecutors too much power in plea bargaining.”).
274. See Jelani Jefferson Exum, The More Things Change: A Psychological
Case Against Allowing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Stay the Same in Light
of Gall, Kimbrough, and New Understandings of Reasonableness Review, 58 CATH.
U. L. REV. 115, 145–46 (discussing the bias inherent in the sentencing ranges created by the Sentencing Commission).
275. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 348 (2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b)).
276. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1)–(2); see also §§ 3553(a)(3)–(7).
277. See Griffin Edwards, Stephen Rushin & Joseph Colquitt, The Effects of
Voluntary and Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1, 41–55 (2019)
(noting a substantial drop in sentencing variance between judges when switching to
presumptive sentencing guidelines and, within a small sample size, virtual elimination of racial disparities in sentencing as a result).
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1. The Federal Fees Commission: Distilling Current Practice
This Article proposes that Congress create a Federal Fees
Commission, a body in the style of the U.S. Sentencing Commission
with the power to promulgate Guidelines-style rules about initial
calculations.278 In the same way that the Sentencing Commission
attempted to gauge the average of criminal sentencing practices and
create standards responsive to that average, the Fees Commission
could do the same for fee award calculations. Given that federal
courts have calculated tens of thousands of fee awards in the last
few decades, each fee-shifting statute can be individually examined
to determine what types of firms typically take cases under each
fee-shifting statute, which elements of a case run up time in that
statute’s context, and thus which elements should be preserved in
the initial hours calculation. This process may require more data
analysis than the Sentencing Guidelines did, but the improvements
in computing power in the 35 years since the formation of the Sentencing Commission should allow data scientists to better inform
what the Fees Commission considers.279 To emphasize uniformity
and to dispel the notion that mathematical precision is possible in
the fee-setting process, this Article proposes that the initial hours
calculation produces a “high bound” and a “low bound” of reasonable fees, at a ratio of 2:1, within which any fee award is presumptively reasonable. In other words, the highest presumptively
reasonable fee would always be twice the lowest presumptively reasonable fee for any given case.
2. Procedural Regularity
a. Initial Calculation: Careful Guidance
The initial calculation of fee awards under a Guidelines-style
framework will mirror the initial calculation undertaken by the Sentencing Guidelines. Unlike the time-consuming step of assessing the
time records of the plaintiff’s attorney, a Sentencing Guidelines278. The courts could choose to adopt this framework without Congressional
action, but given the entrenched nature of the lodestar calculation, see supra Part
I.C, and the current Court’s aversion to data science, Transcript of Oral Argument
at 40, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S.Ct. 1916 (2017) (No. 16-1161) (statement from Chief
Justice Roberts describing the efficiency gap, a straightforward mathematical
formula to illustrate map unfairness, as “sociological gobbledygook”), it seems unlikely to upend settled precedent on the lodestar or do so in the near future.
279. This will likely require the presence of data scientists on the Fees Commission who can analyze and explain the data to practitioners and policy-minded
members of the Commission. This Article declines to endorse a particular proportion of data scientists that would be appropriate for the Commission as a balance
to attorney representatives from the plaintiffs’ bar and the defense bar.
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style document can guide a judge through a similar flowchart-style
series of steps to arrive at a fee range in minutes. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to propose a fully realized version of this table,
but a general outline of its elements is below.
One axis of the fee table would represent the calculation of a
case’s complexity and required effort, and it could start with the
simplest possible litigation victory: a default judgment. And based
on the existence and variable complexity of additional phases of
litigation, such as discovery disputes, an interlocutory appeal, or a
post-trial briefing, the case would progress down the fee table to
higher and higher levels. Specific case characteristics, such as substantial settlement negotiations while the litigation was not moving
forward, could also serve to increase or decrease the level of complexity and required effort.
The other axis of the fee table would represent the substantive
subject of the suit. Fee-shifting statutes in areas that require greater
resources to prosecute could be appropriately compensated on the
same table by having different columns of the table increase at
greatly different rates for different kinds of suits. Discovery, in particular, might mean something different in a hiring discrimination
case with few relevant documents as compared to complex environmental litigation, which might result in much the environmental litigation column increasing quickly from, say, complexity level 20 to
complexity level 30.
A judge would next find the entry on the table that corresponds to the appropriate complexity level and substantive area,
which would provide a number. The judge would then multiply that
number by a district-specific multiplier for their own district (unless
they deemed that an exception to the forum rule applied),280 and
then round the resulting figure as directed by the Fees Commission,
resulting in the calculated lower bound.281 This district-specific multiplier would be set by the Fees Commission yearly—or chained to
a specified measure of inflation—to account for inflation and geographical differences in the cost of legal services.282 Multiplying the
280. While judicial districts may not be the ideal baseline for a single multiplier, as many districts include highly variable costs of living, it is beyond the scope
of this Article to determine whether there is an administrable solution to this issue,
whether or not the solution may dovetail with potential Fees Guidelines.
281. This Article recommends rounding to promote regularity and demonstrate that precision is impossible in setting a reasonable fee, as it makes bottomof-range and top-of-range fee awards round numbers with fewer significant figures.
282. In the alternative, the Fees Commission could simply publish separate
tables for each district, with multipliers, inflation, and rounding already accounted
for. The result would be the same.
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calculated lower bound by two would then produce the upper
bound.
Consider our example from Part I.D.3 above, with Ms. A and
her associate, Mr. B, who win an employment discrimination case
and are entitled to fee shifting. The Appendix, attached at the end
of this Article, provides an example of a hypothetical calculation
under these proposed guidelines side-by-side with its lodestar counterpart.283 The calculation starts at complexity level one for the
work Ms. A and Mr. B did on the case before it was filed. For the
contested motion to dismiss, the Fees Guidelines add two levels,
plus an additional level for a hearing on the motion to dismiss and
associated preparation. Discovery results in five additional levels,
plus two levels due to protracted disputes between the parties, and
an additional level because of a four-month extension of the discovery period. Finally, cross-motions for summary judgment add six
levels of complexity, and the hearing on the summary judgment
motions add one additional level. This results in a total case complexity level of 19.
The district court then cross-references complexity level 19
with substantive case category III, which is used for employment
discrimination cases, much like the court would refer to the sentencing table for Mr. A, our defendant who pleaded guilty to a firearm possession charge. The fees table outputs a value of $92,000.
The district court multiplies this by a location factor, updated yearly
by the Fees Commission to account for both inflation and appropriate hourly rates within the district. In this case, a multiplier of 1.58
results in a $145,360 figure, which is rounded to $145,000. This figure serves as the lower bound of the presumptive fee range, and the
amount is doubled to find the high bound of $290,000.
Why not simply map the primary lodestar considerations—
hours worked and hourly rate—onto the table that governs the
Sentencing Guidelines? The resulting framework would retain too
many elements of the lodestar method and therefore incorporate all
of the previously mentioned problems with the lodestar, even if the
court were not allowed to adjust the number of hours. Additionally,
the Guideline-style framework allows for a table that includes uneven increases across different substantive areas, where different elements of litigation require different amounts of effort.
As in the Sentencing Guidelines context, there are judgment
calls in this calculation. Determining whether a discovery dispute is
“protracted” or not, for example, might require guidance from the
283. See supra Part I.D.3.
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Commission or from circuit courts. But those judgment calls are
clearly identifiable and reviewable, and the parties should be able
to object to them in front of the court and on appeal.
Even a case like Ms. A and Mr. B’s would likely have close to
1,000 time entries to review if the lodestar method were used to
calculate the fee award. Instead of going through these 1,000 entries
by hand, the judge’s burden under the Fees Guidelines is instead to
go through a straightforward sequential process that can be completed in mere minutes.
b. Deviations from the Initial Calculation: One Degree
of Discretion
If the court believes that the fee range provided by the initial
calculation captures a reasonable value of the efforts plaintiff’s
counsel has made, the court can simply select a number within that
range for the fee award. But if the court has reason to believe that
the range does not properly represent the efforts reasonably expended on the plaintiff’s behalf, the court can still deviate from the
range calculated.284
To prevent this system from exhibiting the same unpredictability of the current fee-shifting system, deviations based on hours actually worked would be generally prohibited. There might be a
situation in which a timesheet would be useful to demonstrate
grounds for a separate adjustment, such as bad faith or vexatious
litigation on the part of one of the parties. However, such an inquiry would only happen in relatively rare circumstances, and these
problems likely could be addressed through means other than a review of time records.
Upward deviations for reasons such as performance and contingency could continue to be discouraged or barred as they are in
the current framework, but they could also work within this framework, whether included in the initial calculation by the Fees Commission or as a permissible ground for a deviation, as long as the
rationale was adequately explained by the court.
In any case, these deviations would start at the relevant end of
the fee range. Percentage adjustments would likely be preferred in
these scenarios, although other calculations could be acceptable if
properly justified by the court.
284. Because the criminal sentencing framework provides specific and distinct
definitions for variances and departures, a separate, neutral term is used here for
these purposes, although this concept is closer to the idea of a variance than a
departure.
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c. The Problem of Partial Relief
One issue not directly captured by the new framework is the
question of partial relief.285 Partial relief, unfortunately, is incredibly fact-specific and tends to resist any attempt at standardization.
And as in the current framework, the proposed framework would
necessarily require judges to engage in fact-specific comparisons of
the relief gained and the relief requested.
But that factual inquiry should still be preceded by the standardized fee calculation. This starting point ensures that the inquiry
regarding partial relief is about comparing the relief requested to
the relief obtained, rather than about economic value of the award
obtained or the size of the fee award relative to the relief obtained.
Starting with the same baseline would be necessary to incentivize
attorneys to take partially meritorious cases, just as with other negative-value claims. And declining to do so would create perverse
incentives for attorneys to avoid plaintiffs who have some clearly
meritorious claims and some potentially dubious claims arising out
of the same incident.
3. Procedural Posture
a. Fee Application Simplified
Under this framework, the plaintiff would merely need to notify the court that they were a prevailing party, and the court could
calculate the fee award using a series of objective guidelines. The
procedure could mirror that of the preparation of the pre-sentence
investigation report, prepared as a matter of course after a plea
hearing or trial but before sentencing and judgment, containing
facts relevant to the Guidelines calculations. Even before a final
judgment issues, a district court, upon a motion, could calculate an
expected fee range and advise the parties whether it was considering an award outside the fee range in either direction.286 This filing
would therefore serve a similar function as the pre-sentence report
in criminal sentencing.287 The parties could then submit any objec285. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); see also supra Part I.C.3.
286. Placing this fee calculation before parties have an opportunity to address
fee disputes would also have the effect of excluding all efforts made by plaintiffs’
counsel in support of the fee award.
287. In the federal criminal system, the Probation office first distributes the
pre-sentence investigation report (PSR) to the parties. The parties can then make
objections to the factual information in the PSR as well as Guidelines objections.
Only then is the final PSR made available to the district court, at which point the
parties may also file sentencing memos. Because the concerns about confidentiality
and potential bias from inaccurate information are less compelling in the context
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tions to the calculation or requests for an award outside the fee
range, as they do with pre-sentence report objections. The court,
with or without a hearing, would then rule directly on the objections and requests.
With this process, fees litigation could be concluded in a month
or less. It would allow fees to be determined before a final judgment issues, just as sentencing is conducted before a criminal judgment issues. Moving the fee award calculation before judgment
would nearly extinguish any need for a “second major litigation”
regarding fees and would allow appellate court review on all issues—merits and fees—at once. The district court in Zastrow actually did this, ruling on the first fees motion before the first judgment
issued in 2016.288 If the court had not done so, the initial determination of fees might not have been made until after the 2017 appeal,
and subsequent appeals might still be pending today.
A fee hearing or a fee order would then parallel the current
process for a sentencing hearing. The court would address any objections to the calculation first. Although either party would be allowed to challenge the fee calculation process, time records from
the plaintiff showing more hours worked would be presumptively
insufficient to justify modifying the award. A more particularized
showing would be necessary; otherwise, this framework would exhibit too many similarities to the current system. Any claim by the
defendant that the plaintiff’s fee was disproportionate to their work
would be similarly insufficient, unless the claim were tied to a similar particularized showing, such as a question of partial recovery as
in Hensley.
The court could then address any requests from the parties for
the ultimate award, regardless of whether those requests were inside or outside the calculated range. The court would award an
amount inside or outside the fee range and specify the amount. If
the award were outside the fee range, the court would be required
to state specific reasons for that deviation. The Fees Commission
might even consider publishing enumerated lists of reasons for upward or downward deviations so as to give courts affirmative guidance, although the fact-specific nature of litigation would likely
mean that those lists would necessarily be non-exhaustive.

of attorneys’ fees, this intermediate step is likely unnecessary, and there is no need
for an entity other than the court to create this intermediate filing.
288. (First) Final Judgment, Zastrow v. Hous. Auto M. Imps. Greenway Ltd.,
No. 4:13-cv-574, 2014 WL 1794897 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2016), ECF No. 219.
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b. Appellate Review
Just as with federal criminal sentences, parties could challenge
fee awards on appeal for procedural reasons, such as an improper
initial calculation, consideration of a prohibited fact or factor, or
failure to state sufficient reasons on the record, as well as for substantive reasonableness. However, a within-range fee award should
be presumptively reasonable. And the Fees Commission could go
one step further, using a standard that already exists in the current
framework: a within-range award could only be reversed if the appellant showed “exceptional circumstances” that clearly warranted
a deviation outside of the range.289
And because a sentencing-style procedure at the trial court
level would give the parties an opportunity to raise fee calculation
issues in a written filing, anything not raised in the filing or at the
hearing would be unpreserved at the appellate level and thus subject to a higher “plain error” standard.290 Thus, an appellate court
reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s fee award would have a
limited, clearly delineated record of documents to scrutinize, and
would likely be able to deny any previously unraised objections to
the fee award without expending substantial time and effort.
The Fees Commission could determine whether or not fees
would be recoverable for the appeal. At the termination of the appeal, an affirmance could simply result in an automatic calculation
of additional fees based on a simple appellate fees table, while a
partial affirmance might require a remand for a brief determination
(or redetermination) of the Hensley partial-relief issue. Although
post-appeal fees proceedings could not be completely curtailed,291
the likelihood of substantial post-judgment sprawl would be much
lower.
4. Maintenance and Adjustments
The Fees Commission’s initial tasks—analyzing data and constructing the fee tables—would be substantial. But the work would
not end with the construction of the initial table. As legal practice
evolves, the Fees Commission would be tasked with collecting continuing data292 and amending and adjusting its framework much
289. See supra Part I.C.1.
290. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).
291. A prevailing party who loses at the trial court level but wins a reversal
and an order to enter judgment in their favor on appeal will also necessarily have
fees determined after the appeal.
292. See Data and Statistics, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, bit.ly/3nAJcAX [https://
perma.cc/XN57-V8QN] (last visited Aug. 9, 2022).
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like the Sentencing Commission does. The obvious adjustments
would be to district multipliers and fee table values, but adjustment
might include tweaking an individual enhancement or reduction
that was too large or small in a previous version. And changed circumstances would affect the calculations as well: If, for example,
technological advancements make document review substantially
less taxing, either the fees table or the guidelines would have to be
adjusted.
Given what is likely to be a heavy reliance on aggregated data,
adjustments made by the Fees Commission probably would not
need to go through a notice and comment process, but using this
process would bind judges more effectively.293
C. Addressing the Concerns of the Current System
A stricter baseline with more limited judicial discretion will
raise the floor for attorneys’ fees by eliminating lodestar fee awards
that are reduced due to a plaintiff’s relatively modest recovery.
Plaintiffs with negative-value claims would then be more likely to
find attorneys willing to represent them. Attorneys could more easily carve out a comfortable practice acting as a private attorney general, thereby increasing potential plaintiffs’ awareness of these
claims, both through public consciousness of a specialized bar and
additional targeted attorney advertising. Moreover, the threat of increased enforcement of these claims might cause a potential defendant to take proper care ahead of time and deter them from the
conduct that the underlying statutes proscribe. In addition to better
serving the underlying purpose of fee-shifting statutes, this framework also directly addresses each of the seven concerns the Third
Circuit Task Force had with the lodestar method.
1. Decreased Workload and Simplification of Calculation
As an initial matter, this proposal would create substantially
less work for judges. A sentencing calculation, even done carefully
and deliberately, typically takes about 15 to 30 minutes. This is far
less time than it would take to review even the simplest of time
records. While the judge would still be asked to rule on objections
by the parties, those objections could not be exclusively based on
the amount of time spent, and thus should themselves not require
the review of extensive time records except in highly unusual
circumstances.
293. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227, 230–31 (2001).
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And if the process were condensed enough to begin and conclude before the issuance of a judgment, the concern in Hensley
about fee disputes becoming a “second major litigation” would be
largely addressed. Fee-related appellate issues would normally
reach the appeals courts along with any other appellate issues, dispensing with the current rule that fee awards are to be passed upon
when the fee is fully finalized; that is, typically after appeal.294 The
barrage of voluminous filings that routinely accompany the end of a
merits appeal would no longer occur, and successive appeals would
become far less common. This change alone would substantially reduce workloads not only for the courts but for the parties as well.
2. Increased Predictability
If the Fees Guidelines create a strong presumption for a
within-range fee award, most judges would be likely to award a fee
in that range in the first place.295 Indeed, even with advisory sentencing guidelines in place, Guideline-range sentences are still the
norm today, regardless of the soundness of that policy. Despite a
cultural shift in attitudes away from lengthy terms of incarceration,
roughly three-quarters of all criminal sentences are still within a
court’s ultimately determined guideline range.296 It seems reasonable to predict that in cases where plaintiffs obtain functionally full
relief, the within-range fee award incidence will be at least 75 percent, if appellate review is severely limited for within-range fee
awards as described above.297 This is particularly likely if it is clear
to judges that they cannot generally adjust the fee award based on
the actual number of hours worked. And if the ultimate fee award
is nearly guaranteed to fall in a known or predictable range, sufficient predictability will exist to encourage suits despite the existence of deviations outside that range.
3. Discarding the Fiction of Mathematical Precision
This framework may feel divorced from the amount of work
attorneys do. But mathematical precision is not possible when valu294. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (stating that an EAJA fee request
should be made “within thirty days of final judgment in the action”).
295. Aside from the instances where only partial relief was obtained.
296. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 268, at 84. This number includes
cases where an upward or downward departure was assessed, as those modifications affect the Guideline range itself.
297. The desire for lenience in a defendant’s term of incarceration, a consideration that directly implicates an individual’s liberty, is also a much more compelling reason to vary outside a Guideline range and to expend the effort to do so
than awarding a different amount of money in a case.
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ing the work of an attorney in a context that is inherently non-economic in nature. A calculated range in which the high bound is
twice the amount of the low bound provides judges with the ability
to select a round number within that range that seems fair, promoting an understanding that a reasonable fee cannot be definitively
calculated as a single specific number.
4. Reduced Potential for Manipulation by Results-Oriented
Judges
The Third Circuit Task Force decried judges’ “manipulation”
of the lodestar calculation to create certain results, singling out a
report that certain judges were awarding a similar percentage of the
actual monetary damages in every case. This level of manipulation
is clearly undesirable, and it would be much more difficult to
achieve under a Guidelines-style framework.
But less malicious manipulation of the lodestar was often necessary because a judge had three numerical sliders to work with,
and many valid reasons for increasing or decreasing a fee award
had to be shoehorned into one of the three. A framework where a
judge has a single slider that is meant to encompass all reasons not
otherwise prohibited is therefore a more appropriate framework. A
single slider will allow judges to freely and transparently use their
discretion to reach results that are either tied to the calculated fee
range or are justifiable deviations from it.
5. Removal of Perverse Incentives for Attorneys
One of the most common concerns with the current fee-shifting system is that the lodestar encourages plaintiffs’ attorneys to
overbill in the hopes of increasing their ultimate fee award. This
Guidelines-style framework removes that incentive entirely, given
that fee awards increase not based on hours worked but rather
based on the developments in front of the court over time.
And although the Guidelines-style framework does not provide any additional incentive for attorneys to settle early, this could
be solved by either preserving or affirmatively codifying Marek v.
Chesny298 in the Fees Commission’s framework. As a reminder, the
Supreme Court limited fees in Marek because an unaccepted offer
of judgment under Rule 68, which included an offer of attorneys’
fees, was more favorable than the ultimate recovery in the case.299
298. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
299. Rule 68 allows a defendant to offer to allow judgment on specified terms,
along with costs. FED. R. CIV. P. 68(a). If this offer is not accepted and the ultimate
judgment obtained is less favorable than the Rule 68 offer of judgment, costs in-
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As such, the attorneys were not entitled to any attorneys’ fees incurred after the offer of judgment, as the Court concluded that the
post-offer fees were not reasonably incurred.300 Whether by rule or
by statute, doctrines like Marek can easily be included in a Guidelines-style calculation of fees.
6. More Transparent Discretion
While the Task Force report decried the limited “flexibility” of
the lodestar method, its underlying concern was the lodestar’s limited ability to blunt the impact of attorneys attempting to manipulate the calculation.301 A method with a single degree of discretion
solves this concern, as a judge can simply use case-specific reasons
to justify a higher or lower award, without having to tie it to a number of hours worked or an hourly rate. In this framework, a judge
can be clearer about the reasons they used to arrive at the award
and the amount that it affected their calculation.
7. Benefits to the Public Interest Bar
The Fees Commission, in constructing the table and removing
hourly rates from the equation, will have substantial discretion in
setting fee schedules that fairly compensate attorneys in each area
of practice. The Commission should be willing to understand that
public interest attorneys, 35 years after the Task Force report, still
tend to be compensated at lower rates than private firm attorneys.
It should consider setting schedules that close, or at least reduce,
this discrepancy.302 Increasing their compensation modestly to create more certainty for those attorneys will be offset by the reining
in of overbilling on more sprawling cases.
curred after the time of the Rule 68 offer must be paid by the plaintiff. FED. R.
CIV. P. 68(d).
300. Marek, 473 U.S. at 11. Notably, the Supreme Court did not hold that the
plaintiffs were in any way liable for the defendants’ costs and fees after the postjudgment offer, which is consistent with a policy to encourage suits in the feeshifting context. Id.
301. See THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 248.
302. This is particularly true given that large law firms typically do not handle
what is considered core private attorney general work, such as plaintiff-side employment representations, unless they are doing so pro bono. On the flipside, concerns might arise that this framework will substantially inconvenience firms that
embrace larger legal teams on individual cases and might create windfalls for
smaller firms. To the extent that a substantive area requires more manpower, perhaps because of the typical scope of discovery, the Commission should be prepared
to account for this as well.
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D. A Note on Windfalls
The legislative history of most fee-shifting statutes calls for the
awarding of a reasonable fee that does not create a windfall for the
plaintiff’s attorney. Much of the Supreme Court’s disdain for upward adjustments indicates a similar aversion to windfalls. And
placing a higher floor on a fee award will likely overcompensate
some attorneys. But if those attorneys can secure relief for their
client in a more efficient manner, compensating that attorney for
doing so is not a windfall, especially if flat-fee billing is an ethically
acceptable billing method in the private sector. After all, that attorney must still do enough work to ensure success in the case. And
judges have accepted lodestar overcompensation in the commonfund context, with lodestar “checks” commonly noting that fee
awards are double or triple a lodestar request.303
If a court believes that the attorney won the case despite deficiencies in performance that may have placed the outcome in jeopardy, it can still award a fee at the bottom end of the range or
deviate downward from the calculated range. And if a contingent
fee, which accounts for the risk of taking on a losing case, is not
considered a windfall on its own terms, then simply setting a higher
floor for all fee-shifting awards should not be considered a windfall
either.
However, because this proposal would require a statute to
pass, these issues can be dealt with through the legislative history of
that statute or through artful drafting of the statute itself.304 These
concerns are surmountable and do not create an impossible barrier
to the passage of this proposed framework or its simplification of
the fees process.
CONCLUSION
The lodestar method has provided a framework for attorneys’
fees for nearly half a century. But as cases and thus billing records
become exponentially more complex, as billing methods diversify,
and as attorneys and judges have learned how to manipulate the
303. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller & Roy Germano, Attorneys’
Fees in Class Actions: 2009–2013, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 937, 963–65 (2017).
304. Certain other issues would have to be addressed as well, including the
Equal Access to Justice Act’s requirement that the hourly rate of any fees obtained
under the Act not exceed $125 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). But these
can be solved at the time of a bill’s passage, or even identified by the Fees Commission while it is undertaking its initial study. Or perhaps provisions like EAJA
could be exempted from the initial trial run of the Commission and added one by
one as the mechanism is monitored and improved.
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lodestar calculation, it has become clear that the procedure does
not result in precision.
And precision is not the goal. The goal is to incentivize the
enforcement of statutes through the availability of reasonable attorneys’ fees. Replacing the lodestar framework with a Sentencing
Guidelines–style framework that reduces the risk of a meager
award does exactly that. And adopting a simple calculation aided
by references to tables created by a Federal Fees Commission
solves virtually every administrability issue identified with the
lodestar.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix mirrors the calculation of a fee award under
both the lodestar framework and the Guidelines-style framework
proposed in this Article. The hypothetical case here is an employment discrimination suit won at summary judgment after protracted
discovery disputes.
Lodestar calculation

Fees Guidelines calculation

Attorney request

Court calculation

Lead attorney: total hours claimed
Hourly rate claimed
Total request for lead attorney

192.7
$460
$88,642

Default judgment complexity level

1

Contested motion to dismiss
Hearing on contested motion

+2
+1

Junior attorney: total hours claimed
Hourly rate claimed
Total request for junior attorney

244.1
$400
$97,640

Discovery
Protracted discovery disputes
Extension of discovery period

+5
+2
+1

Paralegal: total hours claimed
Hourly rate claimed
Total request for paralegal

17.6
$150
$2,640

Cross-motions for summary judgment
Hearing on contested motion

+6
+1

Initial request:

$188,922

Total complexity level

19

Employment discrimination:
- substantive category

III

Fees table entry for level 19 / category III

$92,000

Northern District of Ohio multiplier
Rounding to obtain lower bound:

x1.58
$145,360
$145,000

Doubling to obtain upper bound:

$290,000

Court calculation
Lead attorney: total hours claimed
Court exclusion of vague time entries
Downward adjustment for block billing
Total hours allowed

192.7
–11.8
180.9
–10%
162.8

Hourly rate claimed
Hourly rate awarded
Total award for lead attorney

$460
$425
$69,190

Junior attorney: total hours claimed
Court exclusion of secretarial work
Downward adjustment for block billing
Downward adjustment for inefficiency
Total hours allowed

244.1
–20%
–10%
–10%
146.5

“Given the relative simplicity of the complaint and the
summary judgment motions, this Court finds that a
lower-bound award is appropriate.”
Final award:
Presumptively reasonable award, no appeals.

Hourly rate claimed
Hourly rate awarded
Total award for junior attorney

$400
$295
$43,217.50

Paralegal: total hours claimed
Court exclusion of secretarial work

17.6
–20%
14.1

Hourly rate claimed
Hour rate awarded
Total award for paralegal

$150
$120
$1,692

Final award:

$114,099.50

Plaintiff appeals the size of secretarial work cuts for
junior attorney, block billing cut, and junior attorney’s
hourly rate.
Defendant appeals district court’s decision not to
exclude additional hours as vague.

$145,000
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